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"[In] the great sprawling jellyfish which is Alexandria
today * * * the communities still live and communicate * * *
[and] the shudders of monetary transactions ripple through
them like wind in a wheatfield."
-DummLL,

BALTHAZAR 151 (1960).

I. INTRODUCTION*

One of the most flexible tools of estate planning today is the
insurance trust.1 Underlying its deserved popularity are both
the convenience to the grantor of thus assuring uninterrupted
payments of his insurance premiums, and, more particularly,
the facility with which the insurance trust aids the postmortem disposition of the policy proceeds. At death, the proceeds are, of course, received impressed with a trust. Depending upon the directions in the instrument, the trustee may pay
them out at once to the beneficiaries named, usually, in the
trust indenture; or, - and here the utility of the insurance
trust is especially evident - the trust-impressed proceeds
may, in the case of a funded trust, be added to the existing
corpus, the income from which has paid the insurance premium. Thus, the estate planner has available a precision
tool of many uses, depending upon the desired form and
purpose. Moreover, the utility of insurance trusts, like all
insurance in estate planning, is enhanced by the relatively
*Portions of this paper were read by Professors Coleman Karesh and
Charles H. Randall of the University of South Carolina Law School. Their
helpful suggestions are gratefully acknowledged.
1. This paper is confined primarily to insurance trusts in their conventional context of estate planning. The use of business insurance - and
particularly the possible employment of the insurance trust in this connection - is briefly commented upon at several places (notes 52 and 99; text
at note 139a, infr ), but it is not extensively developed in this paper. It is
intended to discuss aspects of this problem in a later study.
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liberal estate tax treatment of insurance proceeds under the
2
Internal Revenue Code.
The benefits of the insurance trust must, however, be
measured against its income tax consequences during the
grantor's life, under section 677(a) (3) of the 1954 Internal
Revenue Code. That section taxes to the trust's grantor the
trust income which is, or may be, used to carry insurance
on the grantor's life. To a degree notable even in the intricately worded federal tax statutes, the precise language
of this section is of central importance. Its specificity has
invited efforts, successful and otherwise, to escape its exact
terms and thus take advantage of the potential tax savings
which an insurance trust may afford. Grantors of insurance
trusts, however, have been subject to personal taxation on
insurance trust income, ever since the Revenue Act of 1924
included an embryonic provision on the matter. 2a Continuing
re-enactments, resulting finally in the language of section 677(a) (3) of the 1954 Code,3 are tacit recognition of the frequency of this type of trust in contemporary estate planning.
The case law construing these statutory predecessors of section
677 (a) (3) in a variety of fact situations is especially rich, and
it remains, for the most part, applicable under the present law, 4
thus affording needed guidance in view of the sparsity of reported decisions and rulings under 677 (a) (3). Finally, althrough the projected comprehensive revision by Congress of
Subchapter J (Estates and Trusts) would amend section 677
2. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2042.
2a. Section 219 (h), 43 Stat. 277.
3. Section 677. Income for Benefit of Grantor.
(a) General Rule. - The grantor shall be treated as the owner of any

portion of a trust, whether or not he is treated as such owner under § 674,

whose income without the approval or consent of any adverse party is, or,

in the discretion of the grantor or a nonadverse party, or both may be ...
(3) applied to the payment of premiums on policies of insurance on
the life of the grantor (except policies of insurance irrevocably payable

for a purpose specified in section 170 (c) (relating to definition of charitable contributions) ).
This subsection shall not apply to a power the exercise of which can only
affect the beneficial enjoyment of the income for a period commencing
after the expiration of a period such that the grantor would not be treated
as the owner under § 673 if the power were a reversionary interest; but
the grantor may be treated as the owner after the expiration of the period
unless the power is relinquished.

4. Mertens says that because old § 167 and new § 677 are "generally
the same in substance," "it appears safe in most instances to cite the decisions arising under Section 167 as precedents in discussing the present
provision." 6 MERTENS, FEDERMAL INCOME TAXATION § 37.09 at 35 (1957).
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(a) (3), it is clear that, even if enacted, it would not significantly affect the section or its judicial gloss.5
The present paper focuses primarily upon the income taxation of insurance trusts. Since it assumes for the most part
that estate and gift tax aspects have been analyzed and accepted, and that the trust fits the purpose of the particular
estate plan, we shall refer only incidentally to considerations
other than income tax consequences. We stress here, as elsewhere, the great importance of considering all relevant factors,
both tax and non-tax, in deciding upon the use of the insurance
trust in an estate plan, and the fact that income tax savings
may be wholly overborne by other considerations. It is, indeed, a paltry accomplishment to save tax money in the short
run through a plan which may result in serious harm to
a client's long run, non-tax interests.
IL THE NATURE OF THE INSURANCE TRUST
Helpful at the outset is a brief review of certain special
characteristics of the insurance trust.6 As the name implies, the transfer of some interest in policies of insurance is
an indispensable element to any insurance trust. Usually, the
interest is that of the grantor-insured who transfers in trust
policies on his own life, typically as a part of his personal
estate plan. Upon his death, the proceeds of the insurance
are paid to the trustee who will treat the funds as the trust
instrument provides. Thus, the proceeds may be paid immediately and directly to the beneficiaries, in which case the
only discernible advantage of the trust device is the convenience of having the trustee pay the premiums, together
with possible tax savings in appropriate situations. On the
other hand, a real (though non-tax) advantage of the trust
method shows itself if the insurance proceeds on the insured's
death, instead of being paid over to the beneficiaries, are designated as the corpus of an ordinary trust. Again, the
grantor may entrust policies taken out by him on the life
of any other person in whom he has an insurable interest,
5. See notes 95A and 234 infra for a brief discussion of the proposed

changes in § 677(a) (3).

6. It is generally agreed that § 677(a) (3) and its predecessors apply
only to express trusts. "A trust ex malificio, a resulting trust, or a con-

structive trust, are examples of trusts which do not fit into the frame of
the statute. A trust, as therein understood, is not only an express trust, but

a genuine trust transaction." Stoddard v. Eaton, 22 F. 2d 184, 186-87
(D. Conn. 1927).
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although such trusts seem to be less frequent, and are, as
we shall see, usually prompted by tax considerations. Finally
the named beneficiary of an insurance policy may transfer in
trust the interest which he has in the insurance policy payable
to him, even in jurisdictions which explicitly assert that

during the insured's life the beneficiary has no "vested interest' having only a "mere expectancy. ' 7 This seeming violation of the doctrine that a trust of an "expectancy" is invalid
is, of course, a reflection of the law's tender regard for insurance.
Insurance trusts may be classified as funded or unfunded.
The grantor-insured creates an unfunded trust when he trans-

fers nothing other than the insurance policies on his or another's life. The trustee's role is minimally to hold the policies
7. This typical language appears in Smith v. Coleman, 184 Va. 259,
270, 35 S. E. 2d 107, 112 (1945). There is, in fact, a good deal of semantic
quibbling in the cases over the proper term to describe the beneficiary's
interest. There is no difficulty if the insurance policy is irrevocable, as
many early, and some few contemporary policies may be, for then the
beneficiary takes a vested interest. See Central Bank v. Hume, 128 U. S.
195 at 206 (1888) (dictum); Hooker v. Sugg, 102 N. C. 115, 8 S. E. 919
(1889); Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Swett, 222 Fed. 200, 204 (6th
Cir. 1915) (dictum). Clearly this is an appropriate trust res.
Conceptual difficulties appear with the typical policy reserving the insured's right to change the beneficiary. Basically it is a chose in action.
In traditional property law parlance, it may be termed a "defeasible, vested
interest," Indiana Natl Life Ins. Co. v. McGinnis, 180 Ind. 9, 22, 101 N. E.
289, 293 (1913), or a "vested right . . . subject to be divested," Id. at 24,
101 N. E. at 294, in which case it is a present interest capable of constituting a trust res. See RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS 2d § 84 (1959). A great majority of states, including South Carolina, identify the interest as a "mere
expectancy and not a vested right or interest," Dryman v. Liberty Life
Ins. Co., 216 S. C. 177, 180, 57 S. E. 2d 163, 166 (1950) ; Swygert v. Durham Life Ins. Co., 229 S. C. 199, 203, 92 S. E. 2d 478, 480 (1956), or as
"only an inchoate, imperfect, and ambulatory right" before the insured's
death, Stepson v. Brand, 213 Miss. 826, 834, 58 So. 2d 18, 21 (1952);
Swygert v. Durham Life Ins. Co., supra at 203, 92 S. E. 2d at 480 (an
"inchoate right"). Although on this view it may be said that the rights
vest only upon the insured's death, Babb v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 224
S. C. 1, 9, 77 S. E. 2d 267, 270 (1953) ; Swygert v. Durham Life Ins. Co.,
supra at 203-04, 92 S. E. 2d at 481, it is, however, recognized that during
the insured's lifetime, the beneficiary is nevertheless "entitled to the protection which the policy gives it, not to be defeated except in the contract
method," with which there must be "at least a substantial compliance."
Dryman v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., supra at 180, 57 S. E. 2d at 166. Since
arguably an interest dubbed a "mere expectancy" or "inchoate" is equivalent to a prospective heir's or devisee's interest which is not assignable or
subject to trust, 1 SCOTT, TRUSTS, § 83.1, at n. 2 (2d ed. 1956); RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS 2d § 86 (1959), the beneficiary has nothing which is properly a trust res. Despite the varying verbal descriptions of the beneficiary's interest before the insured's death, courts have consistently sustained a beneficiary's transfer in trust of that interest, although recognizing
that it could be defeated by the insured's reserved power to change the
beneficiary. See generally 1 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 84.1 (2d ed. 1956); Note,
42 VA. L. REv. 256 at 264-67 (1956); RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS 2d § 84, comment (b) (1959).
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until the insured's death, and upon that event to collect the
proceeds and use them for the purposes designated by the
insured. During the insured's life, premiums are paid by
the insured (either directly or through the trustee to whom
he furnishes the money). A funded trust is established when
the insured transfers, in addition to the policies, the necessary capital to enable the trustee to pay the premiums on
the policies. The trustee's duties more nearly resemble those
of the typical active trustee, since the capital is ordinarily
in the form of securities, and the trustee usually has much
more extensive duties to perform. Needless to say, in a
multi-party group, e.g., family or partnership, any number
of trusts may be established in a coordinated way; and, in
fact, we shall see the extent to which such an integrated
system of trusts may reduce income taxes.
Insurance trusts, especially those which are funded, may
display most of the varieties found in any other kind of
trust. Particularly characteristic is the grantor's reservation
of broad powers both under the policies and under the insurance trust itself, an aspect which has furnished fertile
ground for non-tax litigation challenging the trusts as testamentary in character. Wholly apart from any trust, an
insured may retain under his life insurance policies the following rights, any or all of which may be exercised without
the consent of the beneficiary:
1. To change the beneficiary of the policy, or add new
beneficiaries, thereby destroying or diluting the
present beneficiary's interest without his consent;
2. To surrender the policy to the insurer and recover
the premiums already paid;
3. To borrow money from the insurer, pledging the
policy as collateral;
4. To pledge the policy as collateral in securing loans
from other lending institutions;
5. To elect among optional modes of paying the benefits.
Not infrequently, when the insured creates an insurance
trust of his policies, he will retain some or all of these
powers under the policies and, in addition, may reserve
power to revoke or amend the trust and to withdraw policies
from the trust. The totality of these reserved powers represents an extreme instance of a grantor's retained control over

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol13/iss2/2
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Actually, such broadly reserved powers are

rarely necessary to implement the grantor's purpose; the trust
often takes such a form out of ignorance or inattention, and it
may have serious consequences, both tax and non-tax.
Apart from the tax results of such retained control, the
trust may run the risk of being declared testamentary in
character under state law, and therefore void for want of
the formalities needed to validate a testamentary disposition.
Initially noted is the fact that life insurance, of itself, "is to
a large extent testamentary in character in that it contemplates the transfer of property upon the death of the insured
in accordance with the directions of the decedent."0 Nevertheless, courts have unanimously held that the validity of life
insurance does not depend on testamentary formalities. This
is true despite the retention by the insured of the maximum
number of powers and rights under the policies. The various
formalistic theories supporting this result 0 all ultimately
rest upon and are justified by the fact that public policy,
favoring widespread use of insurance, would be defeated by
requiring observance of the ritual of the wills' acts.
Like considerations apply when the insured, in order to
facilitate the management and disposition of his insurance,

superimposes a trust upon the policies. In view of the powers
widely retained under insurance policies themselves, the fact
that one also decides to keep broad powers under the trust
(both as to the trust's corpus and the beneficiaries), should
not make the transaction any more testamentary than it would
otherwise be. Accordingly, most courts have sustained insurance trusts characterized by unusually broad retained pow8. Such extensive powers were in fact reserved in the trust sustained
in Gurnett v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 356 Ill. 612, 191 N. E. 250 (1934)
(unfunded trust).
9. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Glenn, 39 F. Supp. 822, 825 (W.
D. Ky. 1941). See also Beck v. West Coast Life Ins. Co., 38 Cal. 2d 643,
646, 241 P. 2d 544, 546 (1952). See generally Note, 42 VA. L. REv. 256
at 261-264 (1956).
10. Thus, it can be said that, unlike the interest taken under a will,
the insurance beneficiary interest vests immediately although subject to
defeasance, compare Hooker v. Sugg, 102 N. C. 115, 120, 8 S. E. 919, 921
(1889), and that the insured's death merely terminates the defeasibility
aspect and gives possession of the funds to the beneficiary. It may also

be said as some courts have stated, e.g., Sigal v. Hartford Natl Bank &
Trust Co., 119 Conn. 570, 575, 177 Atl. 743, 744 (1935), that the insured
does not during his life, own the policy proceeds, and because the policy
"does not operate upon any property of the insured owned by him at
death", ibid., it cannot be, strictly speaking, testamentary.
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ers in the grantor,1 although a few contrary cases warn of
be deemed testamentary
a lurking danger that the trust might
12
and fail for want of formalities.

III. DEVELOPMENT OF STATUTES TAXING INSURANCE TRUST
INCOME TO THE GRANTOR

In the absence of any provision in the Internal Revenue
Code, such as section 677(a) (3) or its predecessors, the
insurance trust medium would permit substantial tax savings
for the individual who established such a trust. If, for
example, a high bracket taxpayer directly pays premiums on
his life insurance with dividends of $50,000 which he receives
from stocks having a current market value of $1,000,000, he
effects no tax saving: the dividends are taxed to him personally at his high tax rates, and no deduction is available
for the premiums paid. In contrast, if the tax laws were unreservedly to recognize a funded insurance trust as a separate
taxable entity, a transfer of securities and policies to such
a trust would be in order, since the $50,000 dividends would
not be taxed to the grantor at his high personal rates, but
to the trust at significantly lower rates. Thus, in principle,
612, 191 N. E. 250
11. See Gurnett v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 356 Ill.
(1934) and Bullen v. Safe Deposits and Trust Co., 177 Md. 271, 9 A. 2d
581 (1939).
12. The factors which may come into play here are summarized and
analyzed in detail in Insurance Trusts as Testamentary Transfers: The
Bickers Case, 42 VA. L. REv. 256 at 273-289 (1956). They include, (1)
the reservation of powers by the grantor (as in the Gurnett case, supra
at notes 7, 10), (2) the determination whether or not a "present interest"
has been transferred, (3) the scope of the trustee's duties, i.e. whether the
trust is active or dry, (4) the dependence, in various degrees and respects, of the trust upon the will, and (5) the aspect of fraud upon a
spouse. Too great an aggregation of these factors, and particularly integration of the trust with a will, may override judicial solicitude for insurance and cause defeat of the insurance trust as testamentary. The paramount recent instance of such a situation is Bickers v. Shenandoah Valley
Nat'l Bank, 197 Va. 145, 88 S. E. 2d 889 (1955), rehearing denied, 197
Va. 732, 90 S.E. 2d 865 (1956) in which a sharply divided Virginia court
struck down an insurance trust as testamentary and void for want of
wills formalities. Because of the "doubt" which the prior opinion cast upon
the "validity of revocable trusts", 197 Va. at 732, 90 S. E. 2d at 83, the
majority subsequently clarified the prior decision to stress that "[t]he
infirmity in the trust is not due to its revocability, . . . [but) to the
maker's expressed intent and dominant purpose that it not be effective
until his death and then only if he left a valid will." Id. at 733, 90 S.E.
2d at 86. The minority, however, adhered to its dissent. Professor Scott
regards the decision as of dubious soundness. 1 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 57.3,
at n. 23a (1959 Supp.). Nearly contrary to the Bickers decision is a
much sounder Maryland case, Bullen v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 177 Md.
271, 9 A. 2d 581 (1939). Also on the non-testamentary character of insurance, see Bynum v. Prudential Ins. Co., 77 F. Supp. 56, 62 (E.D. S. C.
1948). See also Annot., 53 A. L. R. 2d 1112 (1957).
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wherever the trust's tax rates would be less than the individ-

13
ual's, an insurance trust would likely permit tax savings.
It is apparent, then, that tax savings are effected not because trusts possess a more favorable tax status or from
any greater likelihood of capital gain treatment from transactions, but simply from the allocation of a person's income
among other taxable entities, no one of which approaches
the taxpayer's top bracket if all of his income were attributed
to him personally. Indeed, it was "[b]y the creation of trusts"
such as these that "incomes had been so divided and subdivided as to withdraw from the Government the benefit of
to income when
the graduated taxes and surtaxes applicable
4
concentrated in a single ownership."'

A. Statutory Provisions-1924to Date
Congress in the 1924 Revenue Act taxed trust grantors
for the first time upon the income trusts funded to purchase
insurance on their lives.' 5 In a statement which articulates
the major purpose of all of the successive enactments relating
to grantor taxation of insurance trust income used for the
grantor's insurance policies, the House Committee, speaking
of section 219 (h), observed that
Trusts have been used to evade taxes by means of
provisions allowing the distribution of the income to
the grantor or its use for his benefit. The purpose of
the bill is to stop this evasion.' 6 (Emphasis added).
This early version taxed to the grantor "any part of the income of a trust [which] is or may be applied to" insuranceIT
13. The transfer is subject to gift taxes (see text at notes 102-105
infra), and in certain circumstances the securities used to fund the trust
may be included in the grantor's estate for federal estate tax purposes
(see text at note 109 infra).
14. Burnet v. Wells, 289 U. S. 670, 675 (1933).
15. That the insurance trust tax provisions of § 677(a) (3) and its
predecessors apply as a practical matter only to funded trusts is apparent
from the statutory language, which treats the grantor as the owner of
any portion of a trust "whose income" is or may be used for the grantor's
insurance policies. Obviously only a funded trust could yield "income,"
and the statutory wording shows that it must be the trust's own "income,"
since an unfunded trust, as we have already noted supra at p. 145, is essentially a dry trust of insurance policies whose premiums are paid outside the
unfunded insurance trust, e.g. by the grantor or other individual, or by
income from another trust.
16. H. R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1924). See also S.
REP. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1924).
17. " . . . [Wihere any part of the income of a trust is or may be
applied to the payment of premiums upon policies of insurance on the
life of the grantor [except irrevocable trusts for charitable purposes] ...
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on the grantor's life. Later, section 167 (a) (3) of the Revenue Act of 1932 limited the grantor's liability for income
taxes to that income which "is, or in the discretion of the
grantor or of any person not having a substantially adverse
interest in the disposition of such part of the income, may
be applied" to premiums on the grantor's life insurance.
Thus, under the 1932 provision-which appears in identical
form in the 1939 Code and, with some slight language changes,
in the 1954 Code--the grantor would be immunized from tax
liability if a "substantially adverse interest" could block
application of the trust income to keep up insurance on the
grantor's life.' 8 In the 1954 Code provision, "any adverse
party" performs the same role as the "substantially adverse
interest" of the 1939 Code. The 1954 Code section is also
rephrased by declaring that the grantor shall "be treated as
the owner of any portion of a trust" (wholly apart from his
ownership by virtue of a general power to control "beneficial enjoyment" of income or corpus)1 9 whenever the trust
income, without an adverse party's consent, may be used for
the grantor's insurance. The development and refinement
of the basic idea, somewhat crudely enunciated for the first
time in the Revenue Act of 1926, is all "[ol f a piece" with the
progressive endeavor by the Congress and the courts to bring
about a correspondence between the legal concept of ownership
' 20
and the economic realities of enjoyment or fruition.
In Burnet v. Wells, 21 a a sharply divided Supreme Court
sustained the constitutionality of taxing to the grantor of
the trust, income irrevocably dedicated by trust to policies
of insurance on the grantor's life payable only to third-party
such part of the income of the trust shall be included in computing the
net income of the grantor." Revenue Act of 1924, § 219(h), 43 Stat. 277.
The identical provision appears in the Revenue Act of 1926, § 219(h),
44 Stat. 34; and in the Revenue Act of 1928, § 167, 45 Stat. 840.
18. Section 167 (a) (3) of the Revenue Act of 1932, 47 Stat. 221 adopted
language which appeared also in the Revenue Act of 1934, § 167(a) (3), 48
Stat. 729; Revenue Act of 1936, § 167(a) (3), 47 Stat. 221; Revenue Act
of 1938, § 167(a) (3), 52 Stat. 619, and in that form became § 167(a) (3)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, 53 Stat. 68. It provides that:
Where any part of the income of a trust...
(3) is, or in the discretion of the grantor or of any person not having
a substantially adverse interest in the disposition of such part of the income may be, applied to the payment of premiums upon policies of
insurance on the life of the grantor... [except for insurance payable
to charities]; then such part of the income of the trust shall be included in computing the net income of grantor.
19. See INT. REV. Co E or 1954, § 674.
20. Burnet v. Wells, 289 U. S. at 677 (1933).
21. 289 U. S.670 (1933).
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beneficiaries after the grantor's death. Despite its irrevocability, the Court stressed the insured-grantor's "rights and
interests" in the continued existence and functioning of the
trust,22 and the fact that income so used for insurance trusts
is realistically used "for his benefit in such a sense and to
such a degree that there is nothing arbitrary or tyrannical
in taxing it as his. ' 23 Finally, the very creation of the trust
involves the grantor's continuing exercise of a "power to
direct the application of the income along predetermined
channels, ' 24 thus impressing upon the trust income "from
first to last . . . the will of the grantor announced at the
' 25
beginning.
These principles appear never to have been pushed to the
limits of their validity, chiefly because the statutory language
does not attempt to go as far as the Burnet v. Wells dicta
would justify and also because what statutory authority there
is has been given a rather restricted scope by the courts.
Confining ourselves to the field of insurance trusts, and
recognizing that even the scope of Supreme Court dicta may
be limited by the boundaries of holding and fact, the Burnet
v. Wells statement could have very broad application. Thus,
if the test is as broad as this case indicates, it is arguable that
Congress could constitutionally attribute personally to almost
every insurance trust grantor the income of the trust, since
the grantor, even when the trust transfer is irrevocable (as
it was in the Wells case), has impressed on the trust income
"from first to last" his "will . . . announced at the beginning," thereby "direct[ing] the application of the income
along predetermined channels." The use of insurance on the
life of another person-not presently covered by the statutory
wording-comes within this test, since again the grantor's
"will" is determinative, and there is, unquestionably, the use
of trust income for the grantor's "benefit," even though
that "benefit" may more directly inure to others. The question would seemingly become whether the "benefit" to the
grantor whose "will ... [was] announced at the beginning"
of the trust was so slight or remote that it would be "arbitrary
or tyrannical" to attribute the income to him personally. A
very broad reading of the constitutional test is also in order
22. Id. at 679-80.
23. Id. at 680-81.
24. Id. at 681-82.

25. Id. at 682.
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if, as the Congressional reports point out, the statute is
intended to reach income distributed by the trust "to the
grantor or its use for his benefit." 20 Of course, it is one
thing to attempt to indicate, as we have here, the outer limits
of Congressional power to attribute insurance trust income to
its grantor; it is another thing for Congress to reach, as its enactments never have, the farthest boundaries of that power.
The only other Supreme Court decision o~n insurance trust
income taxation is DuPont v. Commissioner, 27 decided the
same day as Burnet v. Wells. It involved several three-year
irrevocable trusts subject to indefinite extensions at the
grantor's option, and the Court, following Wells, held the
income properly attributed to the grantor. Even the justices
who dissented from the Wells holding on the ground that
the grantor's power there had wholly ended concurred in
DuPont with the majority's sound assertion that "[o]ne who
retains for himself so many of the attributes of ownership
is not the victim of despotic power when for the purpose
of taxation he is treated as owner altogether. ' 28 These two
cases, both in their holdings and well considered dicta, furnish
a solid foundation for developments in taxing insurance trust
29
income to the trust's grantor.
B. Legislative History of the 1954 Code Provision
Before the enactment of the 1954 Code, the American Law
Institute drafted a model statute,3 0 section X-852(a) of
which taxed the grantor on any trust income which, without
the consent of an adverse party, was or could be applied to
the payment of premiums on the grantor's life insurance.
This recommended version was regarded as a restatement
of existing law, its exact language eventually becoming
section 677 (a) .31
26. See note 16, supra.
27. 289 U. S. 685 (1933).

28. Id. at 689.

29. Other cases taxing the grantor personally on trust income used
on his own premiums include Rieck v. Commissioner, 118 F. 2d 110, 112
(3d Cir. 1941), affg 41 B. T. A. 457 (1940); George Beggs, 4 T. C. 1053,
1063-64 (1945) ; Frank D. Yuengling, 27 B. T. A. 782 (1933), aff'd on this
point, 69 F. 2d 971, 972 (3d Cir. 1934). See also Burnet v. Wells, supra

note 20 at the Board of Tax Appeals Level, Frederick B. Wells, 19 B. T. A.
1213 (1933).
30. References are to the A. L. I. Draft of February, 1954.
31. Except for § X-852 (a) (4) which was not incorporated in the 1954
Code provisions.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol13/iss2/2

12

Federal
IncomeTAXATION
Taxation ofOF
Insurance
Trusts:
Review and153
Reassessm
1961] Folk:
FEDERAL
INCOME
INSURANCE
TRUSTS

The Institute also recommended a clause which would
exempt the grantor from taxation resulting solely from the
fact that the trustee had an unexercised power to apply trust
income to the grantor's life insurance, if the trustee was independent and if the grantor retained none of the incidents of
ownership of the policies.3 2 If, however, the trust income
were in fact used to pay premiums during any year, such
income would be taxed to the grantor. This provision was
designed as a companion to the section exempting income
which could be, but was not during the taxable year, applied
to the support of persons whom the grantor was legally
obligated to support. 33 Congress adopted the support provision, but it did not enact the Institute's proposed clause
exempting the grantor from tax on the existence of an unexercised power to use trust income for the payment of the
premiums, despite the urgings of the American Bar Association. 34
Section 677 (a) (3) had an exceptionally uneventful transit
through Congress, starting and completing the legislative
process with virtually identical wording throughout. Thus,
legislative history discloses no design on the part of Congress
to change the meaning of the section; and, indeed, we may
infer generally that the Congressional purpose was to leave
the provision intact. In its "detailed discussion of the technical
provisions of the bill," the House Committee merely observed
that
Section 677 [of the House bill] corresponds to section
167 of existing law under which income is taxed to
32. 2 A. L. I. Draft § 852(b) (2): "Income of a trust shall not be
treated as distributed or accumulated for distribution to the grantor
merely because the income ... (2) may be applied or distributed, in the
discretion of a trustee or trustees, no more than half of whom are related
or subordinate parties and no one of whom is the grantor or his spouse
living with the grantor, without the approval or consent of any other person,
to the payment of premiums upon policies of insurance on the life of the
grantor, none of the incidents of ownership of which are possessed by the
grantor, except to the extent that the income is so applied or distributed."
33. See the present provision in INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 677(b).
34. Senate Hearings 449 (1954). Even where a regulatory agency
has unsuccessfully sought from Congress a "clarifying amendment" to a
statute of uncertain scope, Congressional inaction has been found "without
significance" to the interpretation of the unamended statute. Black v.

Magnolia Liquor Co., 355 U. S. 24, 26-27 (1957)

(Congress requested

to amend statute because of agency's "doubt" as to its application to a
particular practice; unamended statute nevertheless held applicable to

the disputed practice). A fortiori, inaction in response to the urgings of a
non-governmental organization is "without significance."
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the grantor by reason 5 of a power to vest the income
in him or to apply it to his benefit.
The Senate Committee similarly noted that the proposed
version "corresponds to section 677 of the House bill" and to
existing law under section 167 (a) (3).33 Both houses added
a new provision that section 677 (a) -including the insurance
trust subsection-should not apply whenever there is reserved
a power to affect beneficial enjoyment, if that power can be
exercised only after ten years from the transfer. Following
the expiration of that period, the grantor must release the
power if he is to avoid taxation to him personally of income
of a trust subject to such power. With the acceptance of this
amendment by the conference committee, 37 section 677 was
enacted in the present form.
Thus, looking to the plain language of the statute, it is
apparent that there are no major changes from prior law.
The wording of the section is now somewhat more complex,
although more precise, than section 167 (a) (3). The new
clause precluding grantor taxation if the power cannot be
exercised for ten years, does no more than integrate section
677 with the ten-year period governing trusts with reversionary interests (section 673), and parallels those dealing with
powers to revoke (section 676) and to control beneficial enjoyment (section 674(b) (2)). The sparse committee discussion of section 677 includes no comments, approving or disapproving, upon the rich fund of cases construing the section's
predecessors in a variety of fact situations. However, as
we shall see, there is reason to believe that section 677 somewhat alters the impact of decisions in the area prima facie
subject to the income tax provisions, i.e., trusts which may use
trust income to pay premiums on the grantor's life insurance,
but do not do so during the tax year. 38 The more interesting
case law, involving trusts established by the grantor to support
insurance on the life of another, seems unaffected, despite the
opportunities which this procedure affords for large tax
saving. Finally, we shall examine the possible application
to insurance trusts of other Code sections, notably those
35. H. R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A-217 (1954); U. S.
CODn CoNG. & ADm. 4356-57 (1954).
36. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 371 (1954); U. S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5012 (1954).
37. See the Conference Report: H. R. REP. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1954); U. S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5317-18 (1954).
38. See generally Part IV (E) infra.
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codifying the case law, and regulations which grew out of
the Supreme Court's foundation decision in Helve2ing v.
Clifford.39
IV.

TRUSTS OF INSURANCE ON THE LIFE OF THE GRANTOR

Before analyzing section 677(a) (3) as applied to trusts
funded by the grantor to carry his life insurance, it is appropriate to observe the precise way in which the section seeks
to achieve its policy objective. First of all, an insured
obviously receives no deduction for the amount of money he
pays for life insurance premiums. Similarly, even if grantors
of insurance trusts were wholly immune from personal taxation upon trust income applied to their life insurance promiums, they, too, would not have the equivalent of a deduction.
Their advantage would be merely the tax saving incident to
income splitting, and that is ordinarily less than the saving
resulting from a deduction. The question is whether the law
should permit a tax subsidy for the insurance trust method
of meeting life insurance premium obligations, while not
making it available in other situations. Stated this way, the
answer is obviously no. The fact that all elements of control
or ownership with respect to the trust have been disavowed
does not alter the fact that the grantor's life insurance is
maintained, in this case indirectly, by the trustee rather than
directly by the individual. The substance of the situation is
no different since, in any event, an insured acquires the
same benefit for a comparable economic detriment (the expense of insurance payments) whether he has funded a
trust (parting with the estimated capitalized value of the
premiums) or paid them year by year from his own pocket.
In neither situation is there sufficient economic difference
for
to warrant what would be, in effect, a special advantage
40
the insurance trust method of meeting the obligation.
39. 309 U. S. 331 (1940).
40. This
earlier (see
warrants a
attribute to

undeniable fact gives added support to the suggestion made
text at notes 21-26 supra) that the Burnet V. Wells dictum
very broad power, constitutionally speaking, for Congress to
insurance trust grantors the trust income used for insurance,

whether on their own or another's life. The tax law should achieve equal
treatment, especially where there is no difference of substance between
two methods of doing the same thing, as is the case taxwise with insurance
whether in or out of trust. Of course, Burnet v. Wells contemplates some
relation between the grantor and trust adumbrated in terms of "benefit"
to the grantor or imposing at the outset his "will" on the course of the
trust. See text at notes 19-26 supra. Therefore, identity of economic
effect, as between insurance in or out of trust, seemingly would not be
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That the statutory objective is the elimination of an unjustified tax advantage related only to form and not reflecting any economic or other tax related differences is evident
from a comparison of two cases antedating the 1954 Code
provision. Albert E. Pillsbury41 represented an unsuccessful
effort to secure the equivalent of a deduction of premiums
paid through an insurance trust. There, the grantor funded
an irrevocable trust with his own $150,000 note the 6% interest on which was estimated as sufficient to pay the annual
premiums on his life insurance. With judicial approval, the
Commissioner taxed back to the grantor personally the income
so used by the trust, although allowing him a deduction for
the interest paid on the note. 42 Unless the trust income
used on his insurance is taxed back to the grantor personally,
he would be able "through the medium of a trust to have
insurance premiums allowed as a deduction from gross income
when such deductions could not be allowed if the premiums
have been paid directly by [the taxpayer] himself.143
That is to say, using the Pillsbury facts, that the $9,000 item
originally included in the grantor's income would have been
wholly washed out by the $9,000 deduction allowance, in
contrast to a non-trust insured whose $9,000 would be
included in his income without being offset by a deduction
for the $9,000 directly paid on his premiums. For like
reasons, it was also necessary, for equitable administration
of the law, to allow the interest deduction to the grantor. For
without this deduction he would have been taxed on $18,000
of income, in contrast to the non-trust insured who would
have been taxed only on $9,000.
The sound rule in Pillsbury was equally soundly distin4 some ten
guished in Percy M. Chandler"
years later. There
a funded trust directed the trustee to keep up premiums
on the grantor's insurance policies through (1) dividends on
mutual polices, (2) contributions from the grantor, and (3)
trust income, in that order. The Board of Tax Appeals
ruled that the grantor's contributions, although actually
expended by the trust on the grantor's life insurance, could
not be taxed to him since this would obviously involve unof itself enough to support a statute unqualifiedly taxing to the grantor
the income of any insurance trust created by him.
41. 19 B. T. A. 1229 (1930), aff'd, 67 F. 2d 151 (D. C. Cir. 1933).
42. Pillsbury v. Burnet, 67 F. 2d at 151 (D. C. Cir. 1933).
43. Alfred E. Pillsbury, 19 B. T. A. at 1232-33.

44. 41 B. T. A. 165, 177 (1940), affd, 119 F. 2d 623 (1941).
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Pillsbury was distinguished on

the ground that the interest paid by the grantor there was
deductible, while the grantor's contributions in Chandlerwere
not. The result, then, of these two cases is to 'aeutralize any
advantage (or disadvantage) of paying the grantor's own
insurance premiums through insurance trusts, thereby placing that method and the direct payment of premiums on the
same basis taxwise. The continued soundness of the decisions,
expressing as they do a permanent statutory objective, seems
unquestionable.
Section 677 (a) (3), as did its predecessors, seeks to achieve
this objective apparently by subjecting the grantor to personal
taxation whenever income from a trust is or may be applied
to the upkeep of insurance policies on the grantor's life.
Certainly, the fact that the grantor has renounced all indicia
of control over both the policies and the trust will not of
itself prevent taxation to him if the policies are on his own
life and the trust income has been or may be applied to them.
The cases establish this beyond question. 45 Indeed, section
677 (a) expressly treats the grantor as owner of the trust
"whether or not he is treated as such owner under section
674." That section generally provides for treating the grantor
as owner of any trust where he retains power to control
"beneficial enjoyment" of the trust and then spells out various
exceptions.
The cumulative effect of years of judicial construction of
section 677 (a) (3) and its predecessors is to give it considerably less than the maximum scope which the words of the
statute would reasonably support, and to a considerable degree, the cases favor taxpayers. Apart from the fact that
the statutory language implies an exemption for trusts of
insurance on the life of one other than the grantor, the cases
construing the statute in relation to the trust grantor's own
policies still leave areas where thoughtful drafting may avoid
the seemingly explicit mandate of section 677 (a) (3).
It
is at least questionable whether this should be so in the case
45. Connor v. Gagne, 42 F. Supp. 231 (D. N. H. 1941) (trust income
applied to grantor's life insurance premiums held taxable to grantor although the trust was irrevocable and grantor had renounced rights under
his policies; however, he retained power to change beneficiaries named in
the trust indenture); Frederick B. Wells, 19 B. T. A. 1213, 1226 (1933)
(it is "immaterial whether the trusts created by petitioner were revocable
or irrevocable"); Alfred E. Pillsbury, 19 B. T. A. 1229 (1930), aff'd, 67
F. 2d 151 (D. 0. Cir. 1933).
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of a statute which is obviously intended to equalize the tax
position of two methods of reaching the same result in regard to insurance premium payments.
A. Policies Subject to Section 677(a) (8) Taxation
It is, of course, evident from section 677 (a) (3) that it
applies only to life insurance, 46 and then only to "policies
of insurance on the life of the grantor" of the trust. Thus,
policies on the lives of persons other than the grantor are not
within the statutory language, so that, at least presumptively,
the grantor will not be subject to tax upon the income used
to pay premiums on such policies. 47 Section 677 also specifically exempts from its coverage policies "irrevocably payable" for a charitable purpose, as defined in section 170 (c).48
The statute clearly embraces every variant of an insurance
policy which can fairly be said to be "on the life of the
grantor." Although almost all of the cases arising under
section 677 (a) (3) involve straight life policies, the statutory
language is broad enough to include endowment policies as
well, since they, too, are "on the life of the grantor." This
point was settled some years ago by Heffelfinger v. Commissioner,40 and since that time there have been no cases
raising any issue as to types of policies covered by the section.
In Heffelfinger, the grantor had placed in an irrevocable
funded trust for a named beneficiary a ten-year endowment
policy with a face value of $100,000 retaining no rights under
the trust or policy. In sustaining the grantor's taxability under the Revenue Acts of 1924, 1926 and 1928, the circuit court
of appeals noted that the statutes "make no distinction between
endowment policies and ordinary straight life policies" nor
"between that part of the premium which equals the cost of
46. Since § 677(a) (3) concerns only life insurance, it is inapplicable
to a trust to pay premiums on various othe? types of insurance such as
fire, accident, automobile, health, and the like, although any tax savings
potentialities would be doubtful on other grounds.
47. See Part V infra.
48. An interesting speculative possibility of taking advantage of the
charitable purpose exemption in § 677(a) (3) is presented by these facts:
The taxpayer establishes a funded trust of policies on his life "irrevocably
payable" to a charity, thereby avoiding tax on the income applied to
premiums. Subsequently he obtains from the charity, for a present cash
consideration, a waiver of their vested rights under policies and trust,
thereby recovering the policies and changing the beneficiary. Unless by
that time the insurance had been paid up - as it might well be - the
grantor would thereafter be subject to tax only upon the remaining
premiums.
49. 87 F. 2d 991 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U. S. 690 (1937).
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protection upon the life of the grantor, and the excess over that
amount which may represent the investment feature of the
policy."'' o This indisputably sound holding and its result and
reasoning are equally applicable under the 1954 Code's like
provision.
B. TransactionsInvolving Insurance Trusts Subject to
Section 677(a) (3)
Since the statute does not qualify its declaration that the
grantor is "the owner of any portion of a trust" whose income
"is, or... may be" used to pay premiums on the grantor's
life insurance, it covers every type of transaction falling
within the statutory wording, and does not turn on the transaction's purpose. Although insurance trusts ordinarily function as a part of an estate plan, they may also be an integral
part of straight business transactions as well, especially since
insurance is often taken out or required in connection with a
loan. Thus, in George W. Vreeland,51 decided under the 1939
Code, the taxpayer, who had borrowed a large sum from a
bank, placed in a funded trust an insurance policy on his life
which the bank had required him to take out as a condition
to making the loan. The Tax Court held that the trust income
actually applied over a several year period to keep up the
policies was to be taxed to the grantor. The trustee, it was
held, had no adverse interest. Because it is squarely within
the statute, the same result doubtlessly would have followed
even if there had been clear testimony that on repayment of
the loan, the insurance would be canceled, and that its objective was as much a condition of obtaining the loan as
paying interest or furnishing a mortgage.
This apparently little-noticed decision is important for two
reasons: (1) The use of life insurance in connection with
51
lending arrangements has greatly increased in recent years, a
50. Id. at 993. Constitutional contentions were disposed of in reliance
upon Burnet v. Wells, 289 U. S. 670 (1933), and duPont v. Commissioner,
289 U. S. 685 (1933). See the discussion at notes 20-29 supra.
51. 16 T. C. 1041, at 1046-48 (1951).

51a. At the beginning of 1961, some $30 billion in credit and loan value
was insured under $43.5 million credit life policies and group certificates.

The Institute of Life Insurance regards this as a "major stabilizing factor"
in the large consumer debt structure. In 1960 approximately $125,000,000
was paid out on such claims, and for the past five years the figure is

more than $500,000,000. Indeed, such is the growth of the business that
already 18 States have enacted substantially identical laws, based on a
model law proposed by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners. N. Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1961, § 3, p. 1, col. 2.
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and the Vreelcn case squarely holds section 677 (a) (3) applicable in such circumstances where a trust is used;52 (2)

Generally, it highlights the often overlooked fact that section
677 (a) (3), usually considered as applying only to estate
plans and intra-family arrangements, also governs strictly
business transactions as well. Thus, with the increasing use
of business insurance, especially in the closely-held corporation, a new area for use of insurance trusts is beginning to
open up, and, if Vreeland's analysis holds, section 677 (a) (3)

will apply here as well.
52. For example, such a trust might prove useful in planning a sell-andpurchase agreement in a partnership, designed to avoid dislocation of business operations incident to the dissolution of a partnership upon the death
of a partner. Thus the funds for the purchase of the deceased's partners
share could readily be supplied if each partner's life was insured by the
other partners, and the policies placed in a trust. The premiums could
be maintained by partners' payments to the trustee. The cost of such
an insurance program would not be burdensome, since, in a ten-partner
firm, each partner would pay 1/9 of the premium cost on the insurance
on each of his partner's life; the total premium cost would be equal to
the cost to one partner of a policy taken out by him as and on the
partner's life. The contributions to premiums could be allocated in accordance with any formula, e.g., capital contributions, profit-and-loss shares,
etc. Of course, the premiums could be maintained by funding the trust
with securities, which would, in this instance, involve a very large initial
capital outlay.
Business insurance is also often used in close corporations to provide
funds for purchase, either by the corporation or the stockholders, of the
stock interest of a deceased stockholder, where it would be undesirable,
and probably unprofitable, for the stock to be sold outside the group which
owns and operates the enterprise. Insurance companies report an upswing
in the purchase of large insurance policies (including many instances of
$1,000,000 or even larger policies) by partnerships and corporations to
handle problems arising on the death of "key men" in their firms, and
also by individuals to make available funds to survivors for estate tax
payments thereby avoiding the necessity of liquidating a stock or partnership interest to raise money. Wall Street Journal, Dec. 12, 1960. Both in
the case of corporations and partnerships, the insurance trust would seemingly commend itself as a device for conveniently managing the insurance
on the lives of stockholders, especially where there is cross-insurance by
stockholders on each others' lives. See 2 O'NEAL, CLOsE CoRPoRATIoNs §§
7.25-7.26 (1958).
One important point should be remembered in connection with the purchase of business insurance by the corporation, rather than by reciprocal
insurance by shareholders on each others' lives. If the corporation pays
the premiums, and the beneficiaries are persons other than the corporation,
e.g., the wife and children of the insured-stockholders, the premiums will
be treated as taxable income to the insured. Frank D. Yuengling, 27
B. T. A. 782, 785 (1933), aff'd on tat point, 69 F. 2d 971, 972 (3d Cir.
1934) (insured was sole stockholder of the corporation); George Matthew
Adams, 18 B. T. A. 381, 384 (1929) (insured was majority stockholder);
N. Loring Danforth, 18 B. T. A. 1221 (1930). The theory is that the
premiums are a form of compensation to the employee even though the
insurance was purchased by the corporation "primarily for its own benefit."
George Matthew Adams, supra at 384. For a stock purchase plan benefiting the corporation, it is more convenient for the corporation to be named
as beneficiary, thus receiving the insurance proceeds on the stockholder's
death, and applying them promptly to buy out his stock from his estate.
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C. "Income"
Section 677(a) (3) treats the insurance trust grantor as
personally liable for taxes only upon the portion of the trust
whose "income" is applied to premiums on the grantor's life
insurance. 53 Accordingly, the cases indicate that whether trust
"receipts" are "income" for purposes of grantor taxation,
is a judicial question depending largely upon whether it would
be fair and equitable to subject the grantor to taxation under
the circumstances. This is illustrated by Percy M. Chandler,54
already noted, 55 where the grantor had contributed from his
personal funds additional. sums of money to the trustee to
enable the trustee to pay premiums on the grantor's life insurance. Clearly, these contributions would be taxable "income" to the trust. The Board, however, rejected the Commissioner's contention that since the contributions were applied to the grantor's life insurance premiums, section 167
(a) (3) imputed it as "income" to the grantor. This construction of the statute would have entailed double taxation
upon the grantor, when he received and was originally taxed
upon the amount contributed, and then again upon the same
contributions imputed to him because of their use by the
trust. Emphatically rejecting the Commissioner's argument,
the Board declared that the statute did not "attempt to label
receipts by the trust" but "deal[s] only with income to the
trust" which is imputed to the grantor "to the prescribed
extent of its use for the payment of insurance premiums." 56
Similarly, in Frederick K. Barbour,57 the taxpayer's wife,
the beneficiary of income trusts established by the taxpayer,
applied a sizeable item of trust income received by her to a
policy which she had previously taken out on the taxpayer's
life. The Board of Tax Appeals, sitting en banc, rejected
the Government's contention that the trust income had indirectly been used to pay the premiums on the taxpayer's
life insurance and should therefore be taxed to him under
section 677 (a) (3)'s predecessor. A minority of five judges
53. Section 671 provides that whenever the grantor or some other person
is treated as trust owner, he is entitled to "those items of income, deductions, and credits against tax of the trust" which are attributable to the
portion of the trust on whose income he is taxed.

54.
55.
56.
57.

41 B. T. A. 165, 177 (1940), aff'd 119 F. 2d 623 (3rd Cir. 1941).
See text at note 44 supra.
Percy M. Chandler, 41 B. T. A. at 170 (1940).
39 B. T. A. 910 (1939), rev'd on other grounds, 122 F. 2d 165 (2nd

Cir. 1941).
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concurred in the result on the specific statutory ground that
within the meaning of the statute "[n]o part of the 'income of
a trust' was 'applied to the payment of premiums,'" since the
taxpayer's wife had "applied her own funds.., even though
it was money from the trust. Congress never intended to
tax such an amount to the grantor."5 8 It is not entirely clear
what advantage the concurring judges discerned in this
ground rather than the now quite standard majority rationale
that the voluntary and uncontrolled use of one's personal
funds received from a trust to pay premiums on the trust
grantor's life insurance policies, even within the closely-knit
family group, precludes imputing that income to the trust
grantor.5 9 The two opinions present facets of the same idea.
The majority view does no more than to define the character
of trust "income," stressed by the minority, amd in effect,
holds that if the income is substantially detached from the
trust and the grantor before being applied to the insurance
premiums, as it is when it is unreservedly given to a beneficiary who voluntarily uses it for that purpose, it is no longer
"income of [the] trust" within the meaning of section 677
(a) (3). The minority's fear that the majority was incubating a distinction "between policies taken out by the grantor
and policies taken out by others on the grantor's life6" is
groundless, since it clearly has not made any difference who
took out the policies if "income of a trust" is or may be used
to support policies on the life of the trust grantor. 61
Thus, it is apparent that not all trust receipts or income
in a loose sense of the term, even when used for the grantor's
58. Id. at 915.
59. Id. at 913. A number of cases, more or less following the theory of
the majority, have established that a beneficiary's voluntary application
of payments from the trust to premiums on the trust guarantor's life
insurance does not entail any § 677(a) (3) tax liability upon the grantor,
absent agreement, or facts implying an arrangement, with the grantor
that the funds be so applied. Lewis Barker, 2 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 797,
801 (1943) (good statement of the principle) ; Stephen Hexter, 47 B. T. A.
483, 489-491 (1942); Frederick K. Barbour, 39 B. T. A. 910 (majority
opinion),,'rev'd 122 F. 2d 165 (2nd Cir. 1941); George F. Booth, 3 T. C.
605 (1943).

60. 39 B. T. A. at 916. The minority may have been unduly alarmed

at some loose language in the majority opinion, id. at 913-14.
61. It could also be said that a trust beneficiary who voluntarily elects
to spend his income from the trust on the grantor's insurance policies is,
in reality, an "adverse party", and therefore insulates the trust grantor
from any personal income tax liability on the funds so used. This would
seem to be the case even if the insurance policies were in trust, for it is
clear that the grantor is tax immune when the trust income is directly applied to the policies if an "adverse party" can but does not object. See
the discussion of "adverse party" immediately infra.
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insurance premiums, constitutes "income of a trust" for
purposes of grantor taxation. In brief, the phrase has some
element of words of art.
D. "Adverse Party"
A great many of the efforts to escape section 677 (a) (3)'s
restrictions have centered upon the introduction of persons
other than the grantor with discretion, real or apparent, to
apply or not apply income from the grantor's trust to the grantor's insurance policies. As noted, it is well settled that the fact
that other persons, by arrangement with the grantor, take out
insurance on the grantor's life or pay the insurance premiums does not insulate the grantor from personal income
tax liability. Thus in Arthur Stockstrom, 62 a grantor authorized the trustee to invest principal and to purchase and keep
up insurance upon the grantor's life. The Tax Court's decision
taxing to the grantor the income so applied implicitly determined that this action by the trustee, presumably an independent trustee, did not prevent operation of the statute, since
trust income was actually expended on the grantor's life insurance. The fact that this was the work of one whose relation to
the grantor was not technically that of an agent did not justify
freeing the grantor from the tax. 6 3 An opposite result would
eviscerate the statute, since nothing could be simpler than
vesting the discretion in the trustee. 4
Similarly, it is well established that if, by agreement or
other arrangement with the grantor, a beneficiary applies the
trust income to the grantor's life insurance policy premiums,
the income will be taxed to the grantor. 5 An agreement
ment is the obvious case, but a beneficiary's action at the
"suggestion" of the grantor, or through some "arrangement,"
however indirect or devious, would be no different. It is
probable that the same result would also follow if the Govern62. 3 T. C. 664 (1944).
63. The Tax Court dismissed any contentions based on the fact that

the insurance policies were taken out after the creation of the trust, and
that the trustee had thus acted independently in applying income to that
purpose. "Whether the trust antedated the policies or the policies antedated the trust, seems as irrelevant in construing the legislative purpose
as any question concerning the chronological priority of the egg and the
chicken." 3 T. C. at 668. See also Frederick K. Barbour, 39 B. T. A. 910,

rev'd on other grounds, 122 F. 2d 165 (2d Cir. 1941).

64. Treas. Regs. § 1.672 (a) -I (a) specifically provide that "a trustee is
not an adverse party merely because of his interest as trustee." See also

Treas. Regs. 118, § 39.166-1(b) and 39.167-1(b) (2).
65. See Part V (E) infra.
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ment were able only to show that the beneficiary was under
the "control" of the grantor, although not specifically establishing that the particular decision to apply or not apply
income had been influenced by the grantor. However, it is
doubtful that the requisite "control" would be inferred without more from the existence of the family relationship. But
in all events, a rule of substance rather than form governs,
and both statute and case law are sufficiently developed
to invalidate any scheme the substance of which is to secure
for the grantor the benefit of insurance upon his own life
through some understanding either express or implied from
the facts.
It is probable that even if there were no specific statutory
base, the courts would reach the substance of these results,
on the ground that the statute would otherwise be thwarted,
(as in the example of the trustee) or that some other person was really acting for the grantor. As it is, in the 1954
Code there is a statutory basis in the concept of the "adverse
party," corresponding to the "substantially adverse interest" of the 1939 Code and the decisions interpreting that
provision. 6 An adverse interest is usually understood as
some economic or financial interest in the trust which would
be eliminated or impaired by action of the grantor or other
persons. The existence of an essentially selfish concern in
the "adverse party" is evidently considered a sufficient guarantee that the grantor cannot readily achieve through that
person what is foreclosed to him by direct maneuvers, that
is, the willing application of trust funds to the grantor's
insurance premiums. To overcome the "adverse party's"
self-interest would demand some "control" or "agreement"
or "arrangement," and this presumably could be detected,
and the true relation of the parties adjusted.
Under section 677 (a) (3), trust income applied to the
grantor's life insurance premiums will not be taxed to him
if the "approval or consent" of an adverse party is forth66. See D. G. McDonald Trust, 19 T. C. 672 (1953), aff'd sub -nom.
Chase Natl Bank v. Commissioner, 225 F. 2d 621, 627-28 (8th Cir. 1955),
cert. denied sub nor. Thompson v. Commissioner, 350 U. S. 965 (1956).
The First Circuit ruled in Camp v. Commissioner, 195 F. 2d 999, 1004 (1st
Cir. 1952) (semble) that to qualify an interest as substantially adverse
it must be susceptible to monetary valuation. See also Treas. Regs. §
1.672 (a) -1 (a) (value of the claimed adverse interest must be "not insignificant" relative to total value of the trust corpus). The classic exposition
of the thinking behind the "adverse party" requirement is Judge Magruder's
opinion in Fulham v. Cun,*ssione", !10 F. 2d 916, at 918-19 (1st Cir. 1940).
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coming. Conversely, absent such "approval or consent," the
grantor is taxable, as he is also if a merely "non-adverse
party" is vested with discretion to use the trust income in
this manner. Thus, the trustee had no "substantial adverse
interest" under the 1939 provision, and, a fortiori, he is no
"adverse party" under the current statute. On the other
hand, as the cases already discussed show, an income beneficiary may be an "adverse party,' especially when he acquires the income without conditions or restrictions as to
its use, and pays for premiums on insurance on the grantor's
life. Thus, we can integrate the "adverse party" concept
with the decisions refusing grantor tax liability for income
freely and voluntarily applied by a beneficiary to insurance
on the grantor's life policies. Similarly, we can explain the
grantor's liability where there is "agreement" or "arrangement" with an income beneficiary on the ground that this
converts an ordinarily "adverse party" into a "non-adverse
party" in whose "discretion" income is being applied to
premiums. Thus, there seems to be under the 1954 Code
continued vitality for the earlier decisions which, indeed, the
"adverse party" phrase codifies.
The definition of "adverse party" in section 672 (a) bears
out this analysis, and adds refinement to the prior decisions.
Quite properly, an "adverse party" must have something
more than a token or minimal interest which is only theoretically opposed to, or impaired by, some application of
trust income to insurance premiums; he must have a "substantial beneficial interest" before he can insulate the grantor
by consenting to the use of income for insurance premiums.
Of course, there are no rules of thumb to demonstrate in each
case whether an interest is or is not "substantially beneficial."
The "adverse party" concept thus makes it clear that under the 1954 Code an income beneficiary is normally an "adverse party" and that his use of part or all of the income
distributed to him to keep up policies on the grantor's life
is outside section 677(a) (3). Of course, the beneficiary is
taxed on what he receives or is entitled to receive from
the trust whatever he does with it, but he is presumably taxed
at lower brackets. Furthermore, many beneficiaries, for
example a spouse or child, will have an insurable interest
in the grantor's life, and will have independent and selfinterested reasons for purchasing insurance on such a per-
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son's life. Thus, there is no infallible basis for arguing, as
the Commissioner might well contend, that if a beneficiary
applies his trust income to the trust grantor's insurance
policies this raises an inference that the beneficiary is acting
for the benefit of the grantor and therefore is only in form
an "adverse party." Accordingly, the "adverse party" may
play the central role in "an unexplored form of insurance
trust," now fortunately "explored" by Albert Mannheimer,6 7
a leading scholar in this field.
In Mannheimer's basic case, a father creates an irrevocable
funded trust, the income from which pays the insurance
premiums unless the son demands, as he has the right to
demand, that the income be paid to him. The son is an
"adverse party," and the trust income, though used for the
premiums, is not taxable to the father but only to the son
(even though the income is renounced). Variations suggested by Mannheimer would free the son of any income
tax,6 and possibly of gift tax liability arising from the
renunciation of the income. 69
In this area, there are risks, since the Commissioner is
doubtlessly disposed to view such trusts with a skeptical eye
because of the likelihood of an "arrangement" with a grantor.
Besides evidence of an agreement or understanding that the
beneficiary would use the income for the grantor's insurance
premiums, factors to be considered would include, inter alia,
the fact that the entire income goes for that purpose, the lack
of any motive or incentive on the beneficiary's part to renounce income he might otherwise more enjoyably use,
67. Mannheimer, Wheeler and Friedman, An Unexplored Form of Insurance Trust, 34 TAXES 494 (1956). The article contains a detailed
analysis of several types of trust provisions with carefully reasoned arguments as to their tax consequences. It is appropriate at this point to
acknowledge the great debt owed by this paper, and indeed by any study
in the area of insurance trust taxation, to the pioneer work of Messrs.
Mannheimer and Wheeler in their article, Trusts of Insurance on Relatives' Lives, 27 TAxEs 453 (1949). The 1956 article is of equal importance
in this field.
68. In the most interesting suggestion, the son cannot demand income
but can require the independent trustee to distribute the income to members
of a class composed of the son and issue, or, in default thereof, to use the
income for premiums. The son remains an "adverse party", thereby delivering the grantor of tax; the son escapes tax since his "sprinkling"
power is not exercisable solely by himself; gift tax liability may be
escaped (see 34 TAXES at 499-500); and if income is used for premiums,
only the trust is taxed.
69. Gift tax liability arises from the fact that the right to demand
income being a general power of appointment [§ 2514(c)], if released
[§ 2514(b)] or even allowed to lapse E§ 2514(e)] constitutes a taxable
gift of a future interest not subject to the annual gift tax exclusion.
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the fact that the beneficiary was in some way compensated
for renouncing income for use on the premiums, a near
simultaneity in creating the trust, and the beneficiary's insuring the grantor's life. These facts are of unequal weight,
but they may support the inference. It would certainly
seem that the mere fact that the beneficiary is in form an
"adverse party" would be insufficient protection, if, as we
have suggested, too close an association with the grantors
estate planning activities suggests an "agreement" or "arrangement" and the beneficiary is, in fact, "non-adverse."
E. "Is, or... May Be"
1. The Problem and the Cases
The 1939 Code declared the trust grantor personally taxable where "any part" of the trust income "is, or... may
be applied" to premiums on the grantor's life insurance
policies. The meaning of this disjunctive phrase was the
subject of several important pre-1954 cases which probably
retain their full vitality today under the identical phrase in
the 1954 Code's section 677 (a) (3).
Leaving aside the obvious fact that the grantor is taxable
when trust income "is" applied to his life policies, the statute,
literally read, signifies that he is also taxable whenever the
income "may be" so used, whether or not "any part" was,
in fact, used in this fashion. Thus, the bare unexercised
authority to use the income could arguably entail grantor
liability for the income which the trust earned and which
might have been but was not in fact used for the grantor's
insurance policies. This raises a question whether, absent
some language in the trust declaring that trust income
"may [not] be" applied to premiums, the trust income is
taxable to the grantor. To treat it thus would have far
reaching significance, for it would imply that wherever
there was no such prohibition by state law or by the trust
itself, and the trustee had an area of discretion in using
the income, the trust income would automatically be taxed
to the grantor, on the theory that it "may be" used since
that use is not proscribed.7 0 Thus, many trusts which were
never contemplated as insurance vehicles would expose their
grantors to potential personal tax liability.
70. Indeed, on this theory the entire income would be imputed to the
grantor since all of the trust income might be used in this way.
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'hat this argument for so reading 677 (a) (3) is not
inerely fanciful semantics is evident from the fact that it
was frequently and vigorously pressed by the Commissioner
in section 167(a) (3) cases, and that it achieved Supreme
Court endorsement in a case under the related provision
of section 167(a) (2).71
That the contention is not merely

antiquarian is apparent since unchanged language in the
1954 Code affords the same basis for the argument.

The

Tax Court, however, with some court of appeals endorsement, consistently 72 took the position under section 167 (a) (3)
that an unexercised trustee power to apply income to the

grantor's life insurance policies does not entail the grantor's

personal tax liability.
In Genevieve F. Moore,75 the taxpayer created irrevocable

trusts containing a provision that "the trustees may invest
in and/or pay the premiums upon any life insurance contracts or annuities for the benefit or welfare of any beneficiary or beneficiaries thereunder." 74 The Tax Court rejected the Commissioner's argument that the entire income

was taxable to the grantor since it "may... be" though in
fact was not applied to insurance policy premiums:
71. Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U. S. 154 (1942).
72. For a useful chronological review of these cases involving the "may
be" phrase in old § 167(a) (3), see Durant, That Income and the Payment
of Premiums, 27 TAXEs 904 (1949). Charles Stewart Mott, 30 B. T. A.
1040 (1934), rev'd, 85 F. 2d 315 (6th Cir. 1936), an early case decided by
a split panel of the Board, alone intimates approval of the Commissioner's
argument on the scope of the "may be" phrase. Here several funded
trusts empowered the trustee (who was also the grantor) "to pay from
income of this trust, the premiums on such insurance as may be taken
out for the benefit of the beneficiary of this trust" (30 B. T. A. at 1041).
The income beneficiaries, rather than the trustee, paid the large annual
premiums on the grantor's life insurance; and the Commissioner included
the "entire income of all three trusts" (id. at 1043) in the personal income. In sustaining the constitutionality of a tax so computed the Board
concluded that "the fund was available for such use and was under the
control of the taxpayer, in order to bring its decision within the principles
of Burnet v. Wells, 289 U. S. 670 (1933) and duPont v. Commissioner,
289 U. S. 685 (1933) upon which it specifically relied. The breadth of
the decision is emphasized by the dissent's point that the premiums were
paid by the beneficiary out of non-trust income and without any agreement
or arrangement with the grantor. Later decisions would doubtlessly approach the problem in this way, and lacking evidence of an "arrangement",
exempt the grantor from personal tax liability. Although it is not fashionable to question the constitutionality of any federal tax, it would seem
that Wells and duPont, involving trust income actually used for insurance
premiums, do not inevitably sanction imputing income to the grantor under
the circumstances shown here. Today, moreover, it could be said that absent
agreement, the beneficiary is, at the least, a substantially adverse party
using the income, and that he has a concrete and independent interest in
taking out and keeping up insurance on another's life.
73. 39 B. T. A. 808 (1939).
74. Id. at 810.
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[W]hile on its face section 167[ (a) (3)] might appear
to apply, it has, so far as can be discovered, never
been considered applicable even by the respondent
as broadly as is now suggested.
In at least five other cases this argument was unsuccessfully urged upon the basis of trust provisions expressly

granting the power to buy insurance. 8

It has, indeed, even

been pressed where the trust contained no such authority,
on the ground that "since there is no prohibition against
application [of the income] to the payment of life insurance

premiums on the life of the grantor," the trust income,
despite its use for other purposes, might be so used, and is

therefore imputed to the grantor. This extreme view was
rejected in Coming v. Commissioner 77 which ruled that the
absence of a trust prohibition against life insurance purchases
in a state whose law permits them, does not mean that, for
federal tax purposes, the trust income "may ...
be" applied
for that purpose within the meaning of the statute [section
167 (a) (3)]. Affirmatively, the rule seems to be that "with-

out express or clearly implied authority in the trustee so to
deal with income [to pay for insurance premiums], there

may be no application of [167 (a) (3) ].",

Constitutional

questions apart, this seems to be a sound doctrine, since it

should be left to Congress to state specifically that it wishes
to evoke the far-reaching consequences of holding that the

income of every trust which legally might be applied to
insurance without trust breach is ipso facto taxable to the

grantor.
75. Id. at 812.
76. See Joseph Wel, 3 T. C. 579 (1944); Philip Meyers, 3 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 468 (1944); Frank C. Rand, 40 B. T. A. 233, 238-39 (1939),
aff'd 116 F. 2d 929 (8th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 313 U. S. 594 (1941);
Lorenz Iversen, 3 T. C. 756, 774 (1944). The Sixth Circuit also rejected
the argument in Commissioner v. Mott, 85 F. 2d 315 (6th Cir. 1936), rev'g,
30 B. T. A. 1040 (1934), where the Board of Tax Appeals had favorably
commented on the contention. See note 72 supra for a discussion of the
Mott case.
77. 104 F. 2d 329, 333 (6th Cir. 1939). Another ground of the decision favoring the taxpayer is less persuasive, viz. that the trustee's power
to "invest" funds does not encompass a power to purchase and keep up
insurance, so that under state law trust income "may [not] be" applied
for that purpose. Id. at 333. Other courts have taken in similar cases
a contrary view on the scope of a power to "invest." See Rand v. Helvering,
116 F. 2d 929 (8th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 313 U. S. 594 (1941) ; Schoelkppf v. McGowan, 43 F. Supp. 568, 572 (W. D. N. Y. 1942).
78. 104 F. 2d at 333. On the other hand, the absence of such an enabling
provision does not preclude a grantor's personal tax liability where he, as
trustee, has applied income to his insurance policies, and such expenditures
are proper under state law. Frank C. Rand, 40 B. T. A. 233 (1939), afrd.,
116 F. 2d 929 (8th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 313 U. S. 594 (1941).
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Although a bare unexercised trustee power to apply trust
income to life insurance does not expose the grantor to personal tax liability, this rule does 'not settle certain situations
where, realistically, the trustee might have paid for insurance
but did not do so. This type of problem arose in Joseph Weil7 9
in which the income of a funded trust was, under the trust
indenture, to be applied to any of the grantor's policies then
in trust and to those which might later be placed in trust,
the grantor having reserved a power to add policies to the
trust. On the policies in trust during the taxable year the
trustee paid the premiums, and the grantor conceded personal
liability. Since, however, there was one policy which the
grantor could have placed in trust but did not, paying the
premiums himself, the Commissioner argued that trust income
could have been used for the premium, and hence should be
taxed to the grantor. The Tax Court in rejecting this argument
fashioned a now settled rule of that Court that "the grantor's
liability for tax depends upon the existence in the tax year
of policies upon which it would have been physically possible
for the trustee to pay premiums."8 10 Here the trust instrument gave the trustee no power to pay for premiums on a
policy not within the trust, and therefore the misnamed
"physically possible" test was not met.8 '
Stated more accurately, the "physically possible" test
simply means that income will not be taxed to the grantor
where there are no policies upon which a trustee's admittedly
valid power to pay premiums could reasonably be expected to
operate, e.g., where there are no such policies in existence
or where they are not in trust as in Weil. Whether it follows in law, as it does not in logic, that the grantor is taxable on income which "may be" but is not applied to a policy
in the trust during the taxable year is, of course, a question at issue. In any event, even if this is so, it is certainly
79. 3 T. C. 579 (1944).
80. Id. at 584.
81. Similarly, in Genevieve F. Moore, 39 B. T. A. 808 (1939), the
Board of Tax Appeal applied the same rule to unspecified facts, finding
"no evidence in the record" of "the existence in the tax year of policies upon
which it would have been physically possible for the trustee to pay premiums." Id. at 812-813. The Court of Appeals applied this rule in a particularly narrow fashion in Commissioner v. Mott, 85 F. 2d 315 (6th Cir.
1936) where the trust instrument provided that the trustee should pay
"the premiums on such insurance as may be taken out for one beneficiary
of this trust." The Court read this phrase as referring only to policies
actually taken out after the trust had been established, and not to include
policies in existence prior to that time, including policies which might
have been but were not taken out by the trust.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol13/iss2/2

30

Folk: Federal Income Taxation of Insurance Trusts: Review and Reassessm
171

1961] FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INSURANCE TRUSTS

a much narrower statement of the rule than the position
urged by the Commissioner that tax follows wherever application of income to insurance premiums was legally possible
and not forbidden by trust instrument.
The upshot of the decisions under the 1939 Code is that
the "may be" phrase has little or no independent scope or
effect.8 2 Certainly, it seems that the mere existence of a
trust power to apply income to insurance premiums does not
alone entail grantor liability. Moreover, both the Tax Court
-and, perhaps more noticeably, the few appellate courts
considering the issue-have been disposed to construe the
language of the trust instrument so as to avoid having to
meet squarely the force of the "may be" language.8 8 Similarly, in cases where part of the trust income was actually
used for insurance premiums, this portion was concededly
taxable to the grantor; but the remainder was held nontaxable. 84
There are other undecided situations which
would test the theory:
a. The trustee has discretion to pay out income to
beneficiaries or to retain it, together with a power
to purchase insurance or pay premiums on insurance already in force. Income is paid to the beneficiary who pays the premiums on the grantor's
insurance in circumstances where no evidence of
"arrangements" is available, and such evidence as
there is negatives it. Is this trust income which
"may be" applied to the grantor's insurance?
b. Slightly varying the Weil case's facts, a trustee
has power to keep up insurance, whether or not it
82. One court has said that old § 167 (corresponding to INT. REV. CODE
OF 1954, § 677) required a strict construction. United States v. Stroop,

109 F. 2d 891 (6th Cir. 1940).

83. Note the Sixth Circuit's niggardly construction of the trust power in
Commissioner v. Mott, 85 F. 2d 315 (6th Cir. 1936), rev'g, 30 B. T. A.
1040 (1934). For a brief statement of the facts, see note 72 supra. The
court of appeals construed the language of the trust instrument to authorize
the trustee to apply trust income only to policies which might be taken out

in the future, and although trust beneficiaries were paying large premiums

on the grantor's life policies, there was no ground for contending that

trust income "may be" applied to such premiums. Of course, the trust did
not in fact pay the premiums; the issue was whether, for tax purposes,
trust income "may be" used for them. Cf. cases holding the grantor
taxable where trust beneficiaries pay premiums by arrangement or agree-

ment with the grantor. See Part V (E) infra.
84. E.g., Frank T. Heffelfinger, 32 B. T. A. 1232 (1935), and Philip
Meyers, 3 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 468 (1944) squarely ruling that "[p] etitioner
is taxable only upon the actual premiums paid by the trusts for insurance
on his own life but is not taxable upon the trust income in excess of that
amount." Id. at 473.
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is in the trust itself; but within the taxable year
he does not do so as to policies in force during that
year.
2. Relation to Helvering v. Stuart
The strongest, and seemingly still viable, authority for
broadly reading "may be" in section 677 (a) (3) is Helvering
v. Stuart5 where the Supreme Court unanimously interpreted the corresponding phrase in section 677(a) (1)'s
predecessor, section 167(a) (2), as taxing the grantor upon
all trust income which "may.... be distributed -to the
grantor." In that case, involving a support trust for
minor children, the mere "possibility of the use of the. income to relieve the grantor, pro tanto, of his parental obligation" of support was "sufficient to bring the entire incomo
of these trusts within" his personal tax liability.8 6 Although
the Board of Tax Appeals-consistent with its settled
practice in the insurance trust cases - had invariably refused to tax the grantor with the whole of the income "merely
because a part could have been but was not used for the
support of an infant," the Court consciously took the "contrary view, 87 concludingthat income "may . . . be distributed to the grantor" under section 167(a) (2), now
section 677 (a) (1) .88
85. 317 U. S. 154 (1942).

86. Id. at 170-71. Presumably, the amount so taxable to the grantor
would be limited by the extent of the grantor's parental obligation, and
this in turn would be judged against financial ability, the customary type
and extent of past support, and like factors. See Hopkins v. Commissioner,
144 F. 2d 683 (6th Cir. 1944). It would seem difficult to find such built-in
reasonable limits on the amount of income which "may . .,.be" expended
on life insurance. Hence, a construction of the "may be" phrase, which
would be appropriate in the support area, might be unworkable in the
insurance trust area.
87. Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U. S.154, at 170 (1942).
88. Compare Wilcox v. Commissioner, 137 F. 2d 136 (9th Cir. 1943)'
holding that the entire trust income would be taxed to the grantor under
§ 167(a) (2), now § 677(a) (1), where the trust gave to the grantor "the
net income of the trust 'or such part thereof as he may require.'
Id.
at 140.
Durant, op. cit. supra note 72, mistakenly describes Helvering v. Stuart
as a "so-called Section 22 [now § 61 of the 1954 Code] case . . . not
founded upon Section 167." 27 TAXES at 908-909 (1949). This view would,
by implication, wholly negative the relevance of the Stuart decision for
any discussion of the "may be" phrase in § 677(a) (3). On the contrary,
the Supreme Court specifically observed that "[ i In No. 49, the R. Douglas
Stuart trusts, the minority of each of the beneficiaries brings the income
from the trusts under the provisions of 167(a) (1) and (2)." Helvering
v. Stuart, 317 U. S.154, at 169 (1942). The subsequent discussion in the
opinion proceeds on the basis of the relevance of § 167. Id. at 170-171.
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The Tax Court subsequently adhered to its settled interpretation of "may be" in the insurance trust cases by distiguishing Stuart as "limited . . . to [its] facts" and "involving
wholly different facts and different statutory provisions."8 9
This is only partially accurate. Apart from the fact that all
decisions may arguably be limited to their facts (a position
which seldom should apply to Supreme Court rulings), Helvering v. Stuart cannot fairly be read as a narrowly limited
decision based upon and meticulously confined to its particular
circumstances, for it purported to be an authoritative reading of the language of section 167 (a) (2). Again, whatever
factual differences exist between the two situations do not
directly bear upon the interpretation of the "may be" phrase
in the two sections. Moreover, since in Helvering v. Stuart
the trust funds emphatically had hot been used for the support of the children, personal tax liability rested upon the
existence of a bare unexercised trustee power. Analysis
turned upon the "possibility" that the income might have
been so used, not the fact that it had or had not. Finally,
the Stuart construction, for purely mechanical reasons, seems
to apply more forcefully under section 677(a) (3), since
as that section is now arranged, the "may be" phrase precedes, and applies equally to the three subsections of 677.
On the other hand, the difference in the factual background does provide a basis for distinguishing the two provisions, so that a construction appropriate for one may be
inapposite for another despite identical language. Unlike
support trusts producing income which "may . . . be distributed to the grantor" only because they fulfill support
obligations of the grantor to family members (the rationale
of the Stuart decision), the insurance trust relieves the insured-grantor of no comparable obligation since obviously
one is not bound to take out and keep up insurance for
anyone. In short, the element of benefit to the grantor
realistically is attenuated in the insurance trust situation,
and may therefore justify a stricter reading of the "may be"
phrase there than in the support trust case. Moreover, as
noted above, a broad reading of the phrase might well raise
sufficient constitutional doubt that the Court would not impute to Congress a purpose to give the phrase such breadth
The Court noted the necessity of considering the "interplay" of "both §
22 (a) and § 167." Id. at 167.
89. Joseph Weil, 3 T. C. 579, at 584 (1944).
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of meaning absent more specific language and legislative
history.
In sum, Helvering v. Stuart stands prima facie as persuasive support for the broad reading of section 677(a) (3)
which the Government once so strongly urged. Its authority
here cannot be so summarily overridden as the Tax Court
has done. A sound distinction necessarily rests upon an
analysis, along the lines indicated, of the comparative purposes of the two sections. 90
3. Effect of the 1954 Code
As a whole, the state of the law on this point-the proper
construction of the "may be" phrase-seems little altered
by the 1954 Code enactment. The legislative history throws
no light on the problem, since Congress gave it no specific
consideration. It is true, however, that at certain hearings, the American Bar Association urged a specific provision
relieving the grantor of tax on the trustee's unexercised
power to use trust income for insurance premiums, but
that the Senate, without comment, failed to include such a
clause.9 1 Such inaction at an early stage in the revision
is much too equivocal and insignificant to imply a Congressional purpose to expose the grantor to taxation upon the unexercised power of the trustee.
More relevant but equally inconclusive is the effect of the
immediate Congressional overruling of Heivering v. Stuart,
now carried forward as section 677(b)'s provision that income is not taxable to the grantor "merely because" it "may
be applied or distributed" so as to meet the grantor's support obligations under local law. 92 Its implications are
conjectural only.9

Limited as it is to the Stuart holding,

90. To press this point further: it would seem that a support trust for
minors whom the grantor is not obligated to support, e.g., children of a
distant though dear relative or friend, would not yield income which "may
. . . be distributed to the grantor" since they relieve the grantor of no
obligation (rationale of the Stuart decision). Section 677(a) (3) has no
such built-in limitation. If "may be" is as broadly read here, logically the
grantor is personally taxable with respect to every insurance trust, whether
for family or stranger beneficiaries. Thus, the same phrase interpreted in
the same way but without regard to the background of the two sections
would have sharply different consequences.
91. See note 34 supra.
92. Revenue Act of 1943, § 134, 58 Stat. 51; See S. REP. No. 627, 78th
Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1943).
93. The legislative history merely says § 677(b) duplicates § 167(c)
of the 1939 Code, and that "[nJo change in substance is made." H. REP.
No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), U. S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEws 4357
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section 677(b) does not necessarily preclude arguing the
Stuart construction of "may be" under 677 (a) (3). After
all, Congress was called upon to deal with the "may be" phrase
only in its application to support trusts, and not to go further
and state a general rule of construction governing insurance

trusts as well.
only.

If section 677 (b) persuades, it is by analogy

In any event, such conviction as the analogy car-

ries is weakened by the countervailing technical contention
that section 677 (b) 's specific reference to the Stuart problem

impliedly leaves unaltered the law on matters not covered
by Stuart-the venerable inclusio unius exclusio alterius

argument.
A third point is that the pre-1954 decisions narrowly reading the "may be" clause in insurance trust situations are
probably still viable. To support the view that "may be"

is still to be narrowly construed under section 677(a) (3),
it is unnecessary to resort to the dubious fiction that Congress, by re-enacting section 167 (a) (3) substantially unchanged, necessarily adopted and approved the pendant judicial gloss to the former section. 94 It is enough to say, that
upon viewing this established line of rulings, a silent rejection

of these decisions, which would mean a revision of the law,
cannot reasonably be implied where substantially the same
statutory language continues to be used in the new pro-

vision, and nothing else points to an intended change. 95 Ac-

(1954). See also S. REP. No. 1S62, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), at U. S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5012 (1954).
94. "The reenactment by Congress, without change, of a statute, which
had previously received long continued executive construction is an adoption by Congress of such construction," United States v. Cerecedo Hermanos, 209 U. S. 337, 339 (1908), and thus "bespeaks Congressional approval" of such interpretation, Corn Products Ref. Co. v. Commissioner,
350 U. S. 46, 53 (1955). Many cases follow the rule, See 1 DAvis, ADmiNISTaATrVE LAW § 5.07 (1958). The Supreme Court has also applied it to
interpretations other than those formalized in administrative regulations.
Contrast NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co., 340 U. S. 361, 365-366 (1951) with
NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Corp., 344 U. S. 344, 351 (1953). The Court
has, however, recognized that the re-enactment rule has not always been
stated or applied in "entirely consistent terms," Helvering v. Griffiths,
318 U. S. 371, 396 (1943), and even noted that it "is an unreliable indicium
at best." Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U. S. 426, 431 (1955).
In Davis' view, the rule is best regarded, as Chief Justice Hughes said,
Helvering v. Reynolds, 313 U. S. 428 (1941), as "no more than an aid in
statutory construction," and as not "likely to divest the Supreme Court
from giving effect to a deep conviction concerning policy." Davis, § 5.07,
supra, at n. 14. Thus, where re-enactment has taken place without "any
congressional discussion which throws light on [the section's] intended
scope," the re-enactment has been treated as "without significance." United
States v. Celanano, 354 U. S. 351, 359 (1957).
95. The most recent straw in the wind - noted for what little it is worth
appears in the history of the so far unenacted Trust and Partnership
-
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cordingly, it is strongly arguable that the closely confined
interpretation of the "may be" phrase under the 1939 Code
survives under section 677 (a) (3) .96
4. Da Capo-A Final Caveat
All of these arguments are, of course, largely conjectural.
Behind them undeniably stand the bare words of the statute,
backed up by Supreme Court, and other statements that
the "plain language" of a statute will govern. 97 Despite the
Income Tax Revision Bill of 1960. H. REP. No. 9662, 86th Cong., 2d Sess.
S1960) [originally introduced in the 1st Session as H. REP. No. 3041
1959)1. The Advisory Group on Subchapter J,headed by Professor Casner of Harvard, noted that "[tlhe present language of section 677 (a) (3),
if literally applied, may cause the grantor of a trust to be treated as the
owner of the trust income in some situations where it is questionable
whether the grantor should be so treated." Final Report, Advisory Group
on Subchapter J at p. 57 (submitted Dec. 29, 1958). The committee then

gives two typical examples of possible grantor taxation upon the entire
trust income on the theory that the entire income might be used for the
grantor's insurance premiums, (although it is not), and notes that it "may
be necessary" to negate a power in the trustee to acquire insurance or pay,
premiums thereon. Id. at 58. The committee urged the following language
which would treat the grantor as trust owner when trust income "is...or
may be"
(3) applied to the payment of premiums on policies of insurance on the
life of the grantor '(A) in which the grantorpossesses any incident of ownership; or
B) in which the grantor possesses no incident of ownership but only to
the extent of premiums payable with respect to such policies of insurance
in existence during the taxable year [except policies for charities].
(recommended addition in italics) Id. at 58.
This provision was, however, deleted by the House Ways and Means Committee [H. REP. No. 1231, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. .72-73 (1960)] and the Senate Finance Committee [S. REP. No. 1616, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 66-67
(J1960)], without comment other than the unilluminating observation that
"Ce]xisting section 677(a)" provides for grantor taxation on trust income
which is or may be used for premiums "on certain policies of insurance
on the life of the grantor." H. REP. No. 1231 at 72; S.REP. No. 1616 at 66.
About the only permissible inference is that Congress did not care to take
any position on this matter.
96. The swift "correction" of Stuart in its context suggests Congressional distaste for an interpretation which visits upon the grantor, merely
because of a trustee's unexercised power (either declared in the trust or
implied from its non-prohibition under state law), heavy tax liabilities
which are neither contemplated nor rest upon any meaningful connection
between the grantor and the trust income during the period of the power's
non-user. It is perhaps more likely than not that the Stuart interpretation
transplanted to the insurance trust would also evoke legislative "correction."
97. "There is, of course, no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a
statute than the words by which the legislature undertook to give expression
to its wishes. Often these words are sufficient in and of themselves to
determine the purpose of the legislation. In such cases we have followed
their plain meaning." United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310
U. S. 534, 543 (1940). The "plain meaning" rule is often a weak reed
on which to lean in view of the disposition of the federal courts to accept
and examine legislative history of the statute under construction, but it
is at least a beginning point. The touchstone is the "purpose" of the legislation; if statutory wording is at "variance with the policy of the legislation
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weight of precedent and the Commissioner's inaction in recent years, the possibility that this contention may be revived should not be overlooked. Trusts avowedly intended
as insurance vehicles will face this risk. As for other trusts,
it is desirable, absent some reason for inclusion, to omit a
power to deal with the grantor's life insurance, and perhaps out of an abundance of caution, negative if- s
V. TRUSTS OF INSURANCE ON THE LIFE OF A PERSON OTHER
THAN THE GRANTOR

Since section 677(a) (3), like its predecessors, taxes to
the grantor only the trust income which "is or may be" applied to insurance on the grantor's life, it follows logically
from the statutory language-as indeed the cases unanimously
confirm-that a grantor may fund a trust of policies on the
life of another in whom he has an insurable interest, and
avoid personal income tax liability under section 677 (a) (3).
Thus, a wife might establish a trust to keep up policies on
her husband's life, or vice versa. Similar arrangements would
be possible as between parent and child, brother and sister,
uncle and nephew, and so on to the limits of ipsurable interests. 99 The fact that tax reduction motives inspire the
particular transaction is immaterial so long as the arrangement does not in substance constitute a trust of insurance on the grantor's life. If the income tax immunity of
trusts of insurance on another's life is a tax "loophole,"
it is one which Congress has accepted since 1924, and which
the courts have not felt it their duty to close.
At the outset, one important matter must be stressed.
The fact that the insurance is dn the life of someone other
than the grantor does no more than relieve the grantor
from such personal income tax liability as section 677 (a) (3)
might exact from him. However, the grantor may nevertheless be taxed on the trust income under other Code sections
unless the trust conforms to their specific requirements. 0 0
as a whole" or produces "absurd" or "unreasonable" results, that purpose,
rather than the literal words, will govern. United States v. American
Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U. S. at 543.
98. This is recommended in 6 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §
37.49, at n. 34 (1957).
99. Stockholders in a close corporation, and partners, have insurable
interests in each other's lives; and a corporation can similarly hold insurance on the life of a majority or dominant shareholder. See generally
note 52 supra.
100. See infra at Sections V (D) and VI (A).
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The same is true mutatis mutandis with respect to certain
doctrines of the "common law of taxation."' 0 1 In sum, section 677 (a) (3) is not exclusive. Usually, the occasion for
personally taxing the grantor on a section 677 (a) (3) immune trust is his retention of various powers, thereby
potentially converting the insurance arrangement into a
Clifford-type trust. This is discussed in extenso in the succeeding section, but a general caveat is in order here: the
sections which codify the Clifford concept considerably narrow the choice of insurance trusts, even though they fall
outside section 677(a) (3), because the insurance is on the
life of some person other than the grantor.
Wholly apart from income tax aspects, other tax consequences, as fell as non-tax estate planning considerations,
come into play, and may well override possible income tax
savings. It hardly needs emphasis that such considerations
must always be given due weight in deciding upon the use
of an insurance trust-an admonition that is applicable
in planning any transactions where tax and non-tax aspects
may compete. First of all, just as in the case of a projected
trust of insurance on the grantor's life, an irrevocable 0 2
gift of securities or other property to fund the trust of
insurance on the life of someone other than the grantor is a
completed gift subject to gift tax, 10 3 except as it may be
offset by the lifetime exemption' 0 4 and by annual exclu-

sions 10OL

This further highlights the potential application of the
Clifford income tax rules to an insurance trust, for if the
property transfer is incomplete the trust income (and not
101. See infra at Section VI (C).
102. Irrevocability is essential because otherwise the grantor would be
treated as trust owner "where at any time the power to revest in the
grantor title to such portion of the trust is exercisable by the grantor on a
non-adverse party, or both." INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 676(d). If the
power to revoke can take effect only after 10 years, the grantor is not
"treated as the owner" of the trust prior to the expiration of that time
period. § 676(b).
103. The gift tax "shall apply whether the transfer is in trust or otherwise, whether the gift is direct or indirect, and whether the property is
real or personal, tangible or intangible. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §
2511(a). Commissioner v. Beck's Estate, 129 F. 2d 243 (2d Cir. 1942),
sustained a gift tax on securities irrevocably transferred to fund an insurance trust concededly subject to income tax under § 167(a) (3), rejecting the grantor's contention that he was entitled to deduct "the commuted
value, according to the actuarial tables, of the income on which the grantor
would have to pay income tax" under § 167(a) (3). Id. at 244.
104. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2521. It is presently fixed at $30,000.
105. INT. REV. CODE Or 1954, § 2503 (b). It is presently fixed at $3,000.
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just the premiums paid by the trustee) will be charged to
the grantor's gross income, even though the insurance does
not protect his own life. This is the case, for example, where
the trust is revocable, 10 6 or the grantor retains a reversionary
interest 0 7 or certain other powers. 10 8 Again, we emphasize
the likelihood of this result, since it has been almost customary
for grantors to retain extensive powers over their insurance
trusts. 01a Under these circumstances, which invite federal gift
taxes, the securities funding the trust may appear in the gross
estate. 0 9 In any event, the near-death transfer of such
property for this purpose will likely be a "gift in contemplation of death," and the securities will be included in the
gross estate 10 (although the insurance proceeds will not
necessarily be included).
The significant estate tax advantage of insurance today
is that the proceeds payable after death are not included in
the gross estate, unless (1) they are payable to the executor,
or (2) at death the decedent possessed "incidents of ownership" in the policies."' As to point (1), payments to named
beneficiaries (other than the executor) do not fall into the
gross estate, and this includes beneficiaries of insurance in
trust. As to (2), the decedent greatly enhances the probable exclusion of the proceeds from his gross estate by using an
insurance trust which is irrevocable and as to which he has
renounced all powers normally retained under the policies and
too often, and too needlessly, reserved under the trust.
The insurance trust (unless funded in contemplation of
death), also eliminates the possibility, inherent in direct
payments of premiums to policies in an unfunded trust, that
premium payments just before death may themselves be
deemed gifts in contemplation of death.
Estate planning considerations are only briefly considered
since this article focuses upon income tax consequences.
However, tax savings can seldom be obtained without a price,
106. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 676.
107. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 673.

108. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 674-75.
108a. See text at note 8 supra.
109. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2033 broadly provides that "[t~he value
of the gross estate shall include the value of all property... to the extent

of the interest therein of the decedent at the time of his death." See also
§ 2038 including in the gross estate the value of transferred property
subject at the decedent's death to his power to "alter, amend, revoke, or
terminate."
110. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2035.
Ill. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2042.

Published by Scholar Commons, 1960

39

180

SouthCAROLINA
Carolina Law
Review,
Vol. 13, Iss. 2 [1960], Art. 2
SOUTH
LAW
QUARTERLY
[Vol. 13

and the estate planner must inevitably weigh the advantages
of income and estate tax saving against divesting the insured of the control which he might otherwise retain with
respect to his insurance. Inescapably, this is a judgment
possible only after an exhaustive and informed study of
the circumstances of the grantor, his family relations, his
objectives, and his hopes and fears for the future.
A. Non-677(a) (8) Trusts: Grantor Contributes Insurance
Policies (on Another's Life) and Funds Trust
The simplest type of trust lying outside section 677 (a) (3)
is a single funded trust to keep up insurance on the life of
some person other than the grantor.
1. Within this category, the typical device is for a wife to
fund a trust of policies on her husband's life. A line of cases
both in the lower courts" 2 and in the Tax Court (and the predecessor Board of Tax Appeals)1 3 have firmly established
that such a trust is immune under section 677(a) (3) since
it does not involve insurance on the life of the grantor of the
trust." 4 From an estate planning perspective, this has much
112. Commissioner v. Jergens, 127 F. 2d 973, 974 (5th Cir. 1942); Rockwell v. Granger, 62 F. Supp. 907 (W. D. Pa. 1945).
113. Lucy A. Blumenthal, 30 B. T. A. 591, 596-97 (1934) (leading case)
rev'd on other grounds, 76 F. 2d 507 (2d Cir.), rev'd, 296 U. S. 552 (1935) ;
Gail H. Baldwin, 36 B. T. A. 364 (1937) ; Sophia P. 0. Morton, 38 B. T. A.
419, 424 (1938), rev'd on other grounds, 108 F. 2d 1005 (7th Cir. 1940) ;
Frances S. Willson, 44 B. T. A. 582, 587 (1941), rev'd on other grounds,
132 F. 2d 255 (6th Cir. 1942); Rita G. Bloomingdale, 3 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
1163, 1167 (1944). In the last case, W established a trust assigning eventually some $450,000 in insurance on H's life, funded by $500,000 in bonds.
The policies had originally been issued to H who assigned 9 of the 10
policies to W four or five months prior to the trust establishment. The
court rejected the Commissioner's efforts to tax the grantor under several
Code provisions, including § 677(a) (3)s predecessor.
In Lucy A. Blumenthal, the Board's holding that trust income applied
to premiums on the insurance of a person other than the grantor is not
taxable under old § 167(a) (3) was not appealed by the Commissibner
either to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. A note in MERTENS
incorrectly implies that the Supreme Court's per curia?n reversal of the
lower court dealt with this phase of the case [see 6 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAxATION § 37.49, at n. 23 (1957)1, but the court opinions
were exclusively concerned with an entirely different and separate issue.
However settled the grantor's non-taxability under § 677(a) (3) in this
area may be - and it appears to be solidly established - it is not true
that the Supreme Court has so far given its imprimatur to this line of
decisions.
114. One point should be noted here, although it takes us ahead of the
story. As we shall see [Part V (D) (1) infra), the grantor-taxpayer's
aggregated property interests in the trust of insurance on another's life
may result in taxing the trust income to him personally under § 677 (a) (2),
on the theory that trust income is being accumulated for future distribution
to the grantor, who may be named as the insurance beneficiary. In
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the same advantages as if the husband himself funded a
trust of his own life insurance: upon his death-presumably
before his wife's-the funds are then and there available
at a time when .they are most likely needed. The disadvantage
is that this arrangement assumes that the wife herself has the
funds available to establish the trust; and as noted later,
a husband rarely can escape income tax liability by transferring securities to his wife for the establishment of a
trust of policies on the husband's life. But if this hurdle is

overcome, a convenient estate planning method is available,
with the further advantage that trust income applied or

applicable to premiums is not taxed to the grantor.

The

probability that the Government can successfully challenge
the trust is at a minimum where the policies transferred
by the wife were taken out by her on her husband's life
long before the transfer in trust, and where the funds are

obviously her own, or have been acquired from her husband
under circumstances negativing the inference that they were

given her for the purpose of establishing the insurance trust.
As one or more of these factors disappears or is weakened,
the likelihood of successful Government challenge increases.
2. A trust funded by the husband of policies on the life

of his wife similarly avoids income tax liability and also
solves the problem of the wife's available funds, but it
may prove a crude and imprecise instrument from an estate
planning standpoint. Of necessity, it can serve no purpose

during the probable interval between the husband's death
and that of his wife, so that it will likely benefit only the
Frances S. Willson, note 113 supra, the majority applied the accepted rule
of non-taxability under § 677(a) (3) relying on Blumenthal and Batdwin.
Dissenting, Judge Opper thought (44 B. T. A. at 593) that the earlier
court reversal in the Morton case, note 113 supra, had "deprived of all
authority" these decisions on which, indeed, the Board had also heavily
relied in its subsequently reversed Morton opinion. His view appears to be
an extreme one. The court in Morton scrupulously avoided any comment
on the general rule exempting the grantor from income tax on trust income
used for premiums on the life of one other than the grantor. It stressed
"the practical facts" showing that "the bulk of the income did remain, in
contemplation of law, in substance, that of the grantor used to purchase
property for herself" despite the fact that the property purchased was
insurance on her husband's life. Sophia P. 0. Morton, 108 F. 2d at 1007-08.
This is far from denying the basic law proposition here discussed, that,
as a general rule, trusts of insurance on the life of a person not the
grantor entail no § 677(a) (3) income taxation to the grantor on the income used for those premiums. Contrary to Judge Opper, the Blumenthal
and Baldwin cases seem presently sturdy precedents; their authority could
be thought shaded by Morton only to the extent that their facts would,
under the Morton rationale, show the income to be in effect accumulated
for or held for distribution to the grantor.
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couple's children upon the wife's death. Assuming that
the grantor's wife has been otherwise cared for, this sort
of a trust has much to recommend it as a means of providing
for the grantor's children. Another similar arrangement
within the family is a funded trust of insurance on the
life of the grantor's son with the son's children and wife
designated as beneficiaries. Possible variations in this pattern for the benefit of other members of the family readily
suggest themselves, and would doubtlessly leave the grantor
free of section 677 (a) (3) taxation. In such cases, as family
ties become more remote (although still within the sphere
of insurable interests), the necessity of the grantor's complete renunciation of interests in the trust and the insurance, and the possible consequences of such action, should
weigh more and more heavily in his decision.
Such arrangements, as already noted, leave the husbandgrantor's wife without provision. Assuming that the children or other beneficiaries of this type of insurance trust
have funds of their own, they may, in conjunction with
the husband's trust on his wife's life, create a trust of insurance on the life of their father with their mother named
as the beneficiary, thus meeting the problem of funds for
the wife should her husband predecease her. Such interlocking arrangements must be skillfully and carefully planned and drafted, for they may run, inter alia, the risk of
being treated as reciprocal trusts:" 5 with corresponding loss
of personal income tax immunity.
B. Non-677(a) (3) Trusts: Two Grantors
The trusts which we have just discussed have this common characteristic, that the grantor of the trust contributed
both the insurance policies and the funds to pay their premiums. Sometimes the creation of these two essential parts
of a funded insurance trust is divided between two persons,
one of whom furnishes the policies, the other the funding
securities. Taking husband and wife as examples of a generally applicable principle, the kinds of trust we now examine
fall between two poles: (1) where the husband furnishes
both the funds and policies on his life, in which case he is
unquestionably taxable, and (2) where the husband furnishes
both the funds and policies on his wife's life, in which case
he is indisputably not taxed.
115. See Part V (C) infra.
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1. Suppose that W entrusts policies on H's life, and H
supplies the funds to carry those policies. Although no
case seems precisely in point, this transaction would probably
result in personal income tax liability to H. Applying the
words of section 677 (a) (3), there is here a trust "whose income... is, or... may be... applied to the payment of premiums on policies of insurance on the life of the grantor." It
seems unquestionable that within the meaning of this language
H is "the grantor" of the trust "whose income" is so employed. This result would, be no different under section
167(a) (3) of the 1939 Code.
2. The more teasing problem is the one supposedly settled
by the 1944 Tax Court decision in W. C. Cartinhour.116 The
pattern exemplified there is the transfer by H of policies
upon his own life to a trust which is funded by W. Assuming
the absence of any tax evasion scheme, such as an arranged
transfer of securities by W, 11(
la the question is whether H
is subject to section 677 (a) (3) taxation on trust income
which is or may be applied to those policies. In holding
that H is not taxable, the majority in the Cartinhour case
observed that the arguments favoring H's tax liability "at first
blush may seem to be sound; for [H] was a grantor and
trust income was applied to the payment of premiums upon
policies of insurance on his life."" 7 But the statute "was
never intended to apply" to a fact situation such as this,
for "[t]he income in issue was derived solely from property
contributed to the trust by [W] ."118 The court thought that
the broad test of economic benefit to the grantor stated in
Burnet v. Wells"19 was beside the point, since here, unlike
the Supreme Court case, H "had not chosen to dedicate any
1 20
of his property to preserving his contracts" of insurance.
Several dissenting judges offered a technical reading of the
statute to support grantor taxation under these facts ;120
more persuasively they argued that confinement of old section 167 (a) (3) "to a case where the part of the trust income
so used is derived from property contributed by the insured
116. 3 T. C. 482 (1944).
116a. See Part V (E) infra.

117. 3 T. C. at 490.
118. Id. at 490-91.
119. Burnet v. Wells, 289 U. S. 670 (1933).
120. 3 T. C. 482 at 491.
120a. For their argument, see note 122 infra.
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: * . is an unwarranted restriction which defeats the obvious
intendment of the statute and provides a plain loophole."'12 1
Analytically, the majority view seems erroneous, and perhaps more obviously so on the language of section 677 (a) (3)
than on old 167 (a) (3) under which Cartinhourwas decided.
Matching facts against the present statutory language, there
is clearly a "trust" "whose income" is or may be applied
to "policies on the life of the grantor." The argument that
H (who contributed his life insurance policies) is not taxable rests almost entirely upon the two words "the grantor,"
since implicit in the Tax Court majority view is the premise
that H was not "the grantor" within the statute's meaning.
But in turning over policies to the trust, H is at the very
least "a grantor" of the trust, and indeed the Tax Court
majority recognized that H in fact "was a grantor" of the
trust. 2 2 Certainly no one would doubt that if a man establishes

an unfunded trust of his insurance policies, he is "the grantor"
of that trust. With this fact in mind, the possible difference
between the actual statutory language--"the grantor"-and
the hypothetical "a grantor"' seems an exceedingly slim
basis upon which to ground the weight of the tax exemption
carved out by the Cartinhour ruling. The effect, therefore,
of Cartinhour is to restate the statute to provide in effect
that "the grantor shall be treated as the owner of any portion of a trust . . . whose income, received from property
transferred by such grantor, is, or... may be... applied"
to insurance on such grantor's life.
Other considerations support this criticism of the Cartinhour case. In the first place, section 677 (a) (3) and its
predecessors were enacted because "[t] rusts' have been used
to evade taxes .by means of provisions allowing the distribution of the income to the grantor or its use for his benefit. 23 A clearer case of trust income "use[d] for his benefit"
could scarcely be conceived. Again the broad rationale of
Burnet v. Wells does not deserve so niggardly a reading as
the Tax Court majority gave it in the Cartinhourcase. Cer121. Id. at 490.

122. Id. at 490. On the technical problem of statutory construction, the
dissent urged that "the words the grantor may properly be interpreted
collectively" so as to include both the contributor of the policies and of
the funding securities. Id. at 493. Whatever the approach, the degree of
generosity in reading the statutory words depends first and foremost
upon recognizing its purpose. See text at note 123 infra.
123. H. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1924), quoted in the

text at note 16 supra.
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tainly, in Cartinhour it seems that trust income had been
used "for [the grantor's] benefit in such a sense and to
such a degree that there is nothing arbitrary or tyrannical
124
in treating it as his."'
C. The Reciprocal Trust Doctrine
Sometimes there is an effort to couple the tax advantages
of creating a trust of insurance on another's life with a
de facto retention of powers or financial rights through
various devices. In the field of insurance trust, as elsewhere, there is no question that the "real" rather than the
nominal grantor of a trust will be treated as the trust owner
if, for example, the nominal grantor is but a strawman acting for the "real" grantor, or if the nominal grantor has
established the trust in exchange for a bargained for consideration from the "real" grantor. 12 5 In terms of insurance
trusts, this would follow if, for instance, one paid a third
party to take out policies of insurance on one's own life and to
transfer the policies together with securities to a funded insurance trust. A somewhat more sophisticated, although now
ineffectual, method is to use reciprocal or cross trusts, in
which the basic pattern is for A to fund a trust of insurance
on B's life, while B, as part of the same transaction (either
simultaneously or related in time) funds a trust of insurance on A's life. Since the decision in Lehman v. Commissioner,120 this or like devices have either been disregarded,
or treated as highly suspect by the Commissioner, although
27
the courts currently tend to favor the taxpayer.
124. Burnet v. Wells, 289 U. S. 670, 680-681 (1933).
125. These are the two hypothetical examples cited by Judge Hastie in his
thoughtful opinion in Newbery's Estate v. Commissioiier, 201 F. 2d 874,
876-77 (3d Cir. 1953). For an actual case of this sort, see National Bank
of Commerce v. Clanson, 226 F. 2d 446 (1st Cir. 1955) in which a trust
'was created for a widow by her family as a part of an agreement where,
for business" reasons, she released her statutory claim to take against her
husband's will. A portion of this trust (of which the nominal grantor
was a person other than the decedent) was included under the predecessor
of INT. REV. CODE oF 1954, § 2038 (a), relating to her gross estate property
transferred by a decedent but subject at death to a power to revoke,
amend, etc.
126. 109 F. 2d 99 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 310 U. S.637 (1940).
127. Virtually all of the reported cases in the courts on the reciprocal
trust problem have arisen in the context of whether a trust created by
some person other than the decedent should be included in the decedent's
'estate. However, there seem to be no such peculiarities in the estate tax
provisions as would prevent these decisions and their underlying principles
being equally applicable to income tax problems as well. The discussion that

follows assumes that there is a valid analogy.
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The Lehman type situation is illustrated by Purdon S.
Whiteley 128 holding that the two trusts to be described were
reciprocal, and that the taxpayer should be treated, for purposes of income taxation, as the real grantor of a trust created
by her brother. There the taxpayer's brother, naming himself as beneficiary, transferred insurance policies on the taxpayer's life to a trust funded by stock and bonds and also
by the taxpayer's $250,000 note on which she paid interest
for several years. Two days later, the taxpayer herself
created a trust of stocks, bonds, and her brother's $250,000
note, granting the trustee power to take out insurance on
her brother's life. In imputing income of her brother's
trust to the taxpayer, the court stressed the fact that "in
all material respects the terms of the trusts were identical,"
and that there was "no other motive for the transaction"
than the creation of reciprocal trusts.1 29 Since, therefore,
income of the brother's trust had been applied to policies on
the taxpayer's life (for her brother's benefit), it was
held that this amount was taxable to her, as the real grantor,
under old section 167 (a) (3).
The precise extent of the Lehman doctrine is unclear, and,
in any event, cannot be elaborated here. It is apparently
undisputed that the trusts need not be identical as to the
value of the corpus. Therefore, an insurance trust funded
with H's 700 shares and W's 300 shares would be treated
as reciprocal to the extent of 300 shares 13 0 Identity
of trust provisions seems unnecessary, although doubtlessly
increasing divergence of the provisions would suggest that
the trusts were not truly reciprocal. 1 Greatest stress seems
to lie upon the question whether the trusts were created in
consideration of or as quid pro quo for each other, since
"the fact that trusts contained 'reciprocal' or 'crossed' provisions ... is significant only to the extent that it may reveal a quid pro quo which another than the named grantor
132
has paid for the creation of the trust in controversy."
128.
129.
130.
140 F.

42 B. T. A. 316 (1940).
Id. at 320.
In substance, this was the result in Cole's Estate v. Commissioner,
2d 636 (8th Cir. 1944).

131. As Judge Patterson said in Lehman v. Commissioner, "it happened

[in that case] that the trusts were identical, and the case for a tax is the

stronger for it." 109 F. 2d at 100. There was some disparity in the trust

provisions in Purdon S. Whiteley, supra note 128, but it was treated as immaterial.
132. Newberry's Estate v. Commissioner, 201 F. 2d 874 at 877 (3d Cir.
1953).
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In Whiteley, as in certain other non-insurance trust cases,
the element of quid pro quo has been so far minimized that
the fact of reciprocity alone has almost seemed enough to
cast the tax burden upon the "real" grantor of the trust.
Earlier an example was suggested where H created a trust
of insurance on his wife's life, for a child's benefit, or on his
son's life for the benefit of the son's children. 183 To what
extent would tax dangers be incurred if the wife, or the son,
simultaneously created a trust of insurance on H's life for
the benefit of H's wife? Presumably, if it could be shown
that "the establishment of 'reciprocal' or 'crossed' trusts was
a technical device for realizing the quid pro quo of a bargain,"'13 4 it would seem that H could be taxed on the income
used to keep up policies on his life by the trust created by
his wife or son. Treating H as the "real grantor" of those
trusts, it would follow that the income had been used, as
section 677(a) (3) provides, for "payment of premiums on
policies of insurance on the life of the [real] grantor." Although proof within the family circle would ordinarily be
difficult, Whiteley, if its authority stands unimpaired, comes
close to placing the burden of proving no bargain on the taxpayer who the Commissioner claims is the "real grantor.1' 8 5
On the other hand, the likelihood of finding the trusts reciprocal diminishes to the vanishing point with the lapse
ef time, " "' the increasing variance of trust provisions, 3 7
and affirmative testimony that either one of the trusts would
have in fact been created whether or not its opposite number
was established. 13 8 But this does not alter the fact that interlocking arrangements of this sort have apparently fallen
into disfavor because of their somewhat exposed position
taxwise, although the more recent Court of Appeals decisions
unabashedly favor the taxpayer by very strict and sometimes
ridiculous construction of the quid pro quo rule. 3 9
133. See Section V (A) (2) supra.
134. Newberry's Estate v. Commissioner, supra note 132, at 878.
135. Purdon S. Whiteley, 42 B. T. A. 316, 320 (1940).
136. Thus, in In re Lueder's Estate, 164 F. 2d 128 (3d Cir. 1947),
the Court of Appeals, reversing the Tax Court's finding of reciprocal
trusts, held they were not such "as a matter of law" (id. at 136), since
they had been created, not simultaneously, but more than 15 months apart
(id. at 134) and there was no evidence of any agreement or understanding
that the trusts were consideration for each other (ibid).
137. See note 131 supra.
138. Such testimony had a decisive impact in Newberry's Estate v. Commissioner, 201 F. 2d 874 at 875, 877-78 (3d Cir. 1953).

139. This attrition of the Lehman doctrine that began with In re Leuder's Estate, 164 F. 2d 128 (3d Cir. 1947) and which was skillfully ra-
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Finally, possible application of the reciprocal trust doctrine
must be carefully considered whenever, in planning ahead
for a partnership or close corporation, a buy-and-sell arrangement employs funded insurance trusts as a device for financing the purchase of the interest of a deceased partner
or stockholder. Similar trusts simultaneously established
by the several partners or stockholders may well be considered reciprocal, although this defect seemingly would not
apply, for instance, to a single trust created by the corporation itself to finance repurchase of a deceased stockholder's
interest.19a
D. Application of Sections 677(a) (1) and

(a) (2) to Insurance Trusts
Although a trust of insurance on the life of someone other
than the grantor will not entail personal income taxation to
the trust's grantor under section 677(a) (3), the tax advantage thus gained may nevertheless be forfeited through
the operation of two other provisions of the same section,
subsections (a) (1) and (a) (2).
tionalized in Newberry's Estate v. Commissioner, 201.F. 2d 874 (3d Cir.
1953) went very far indeed in the decision of the Seventh Circuit in McLain v. Jarecki, 232 F. 2d 211 (7th Cir. 1956). There, admittedly similar
trusts had been created simultaneously by husband and wife, and thereafter simultaneously amended. The issue was whether the wife's trust
should be included in the deceased husband's gross estate. In by-passing
Lehman, the court considered that it need only "search for consideration
moving from the decedent to" the other party. It concluded from the stipulated facts that there was nothing to show that the decedent "brought about
the transfer" in trust made by his wife, and refused to "infer an element
of consideration" from the fact of the "substantially identical trusts created
concurrently and prepared by their mutual lawyers." It appeared to regard
"oral testimony" as the only source for determining the "subjective understanding between the parties ,that will equate to quid pro quo," and that
because of the "remote [ness] in time" and unavailability of "oral testimony" as to the intention, there is no basis for treating the trusts as reciprocal for estate tax purposes. The dissent argued - it is believed more
realistically - that "[it is an undue taxing of our credulity to ask us
to believe that this transaction lacked consideration" and that the "only
logical, inference" was that "the act of one was the consideration for the
act of the other."
It should be noted that the Tax Court tends to side with the Commissioner
by interpreting the Lehman doctrine less restrictively than the more recent
court decisions. See Estate of Florence B. Moreno, 28 T. C. 889 (1957),
aff'd, 260 F. 2d 389 (8th Cir. 1958); Estate of Laura Carter, 31 T. C. 1148
(1959). It has deflected the force of the judicial rulings by asserting that
the question involved in all reciprocal trust cases is factual" so that "little
purpose is served by an extensive discussion of the factual background of
each case." Estate of Laura Carter, supra at 1154, distinguishing Newberry's Estate, supranote 139 and McLain, supra note 139.
139a. For an interesting administrative determination, see Rev. Rul.
56-397, 1956, INT. REV. BULL. No. 34. Here two business associates cross-
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1. Section 677(a) (2) (Corresponding to 167(a) (1)
the 1939 Code)

of

Section 677 (a) (2), substantially identical with section
167 (a) (1) of the 1939 Code, is the provision most likely
to have an immediate impact upon insurance trusts immune
from taxation under section 677(a) (3). As it now reads,
the section taxes the grantor upon trust income which "is
...
or may be... held or accumulated for future distribution
to the grantor." The proper interpretation and scope of this
provision demands full examination of a large body of law
erected upon the 1939 Code section. Its overall objective,
however, is adequately illustrated by the simplest sort of
fact situation: a corporate executive creates a trust of securities, the income from which is not to be distributed to him
during the years when his salary places him in high tax
brackets, but is to be retained and distributed to him upon
his retirement. If such a device were possible--which it is
not39b-much current income tax could be defeated by deflecting the income to a later date when its receipt would
presumably be taxed at lower rates. The circumstances
which entail section 677 (a) (2) tax liability are beyond this
article's compass, although, generally summarizing results
under 1939 Code cases, a contingent possibility of diversion
of trust income to the, grantor was enough to result in taxation of the income to him,140 subject to a limitation of
uncertain scope if the possibility of diversion was thought
too "remote.' ' 14 '
insured each other's life to provide funds to repurchase the decedent's in-

terest; each retained all incidents of ownership in the policy lie owned.
The Service held that the decedent's estate need not include, under INT.
REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2033, the proceeds which became available to his
liring associate as a result of the death. Application of the Lehman doc-

trine was rejected on the ground that here, unlike Lehman, "the decedent
made no transfer of insurance or any other property." Although obviously not involving a funded trust, this ruling may foreshadow an accommodating attitude in this area by the Internal Revenue Service.

139b. It is for this reason that special legislation is needed to defer pres-

ent income taxation of the income produced by corporation pension trusts.
See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 401-404, with which provisions precise compliance is necessary to secure tax postponement. Comparable tax accommodation has been vigorously pressed by the self-employed and others who

are unable to seek shelter under this section.
140. Kent v. Rothensies, 120 F. 2d 476 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U. S.

659 (1941) (accumulation' for two years with payment thereafter to the
grantor) ; Altmaier v. Commissioner, 116 F. 2d 162 (6th Cir. 1940) ; Hel-

vering v. Evans, 126 F. 2d 270 (3d Cir. 1942); Wenger v. Commissioner,
127 F. 2d 523 (6th Cir. 1942).
141. See Henry Martin Baker, 43 B. T. A. 1029 (1941)

(grantor would

acquire the accumulated income only if he survived his wife, his minor son
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In a very real sense, purchase of insurance is a type of
accumulation of income for future distribution to the beneficiary or to the insured, as the case may be. Indeed, there
have been cases under state law on whether insurance purchases are an unlawful accumulation. 142 The operation of
section 677 (a) (2) upon a section 677 (a) (3) immune insurance trust is illustrated by Commissionerv. Morton.1 43 There a

wife funded a trust to keep up the premiums on $275,000
face value insurance which she had taken out on her husband's life. So far, this is a straight trust the income from
which would not be taxed either to the wife or the husband, but
only to the trust itself. The trust indenture gave the husband
the sole right to terminate the trust, in which event he
would receive accumulated income, the corpus revesting in
the wife. Otherwise, three years after his death, the grantorwife had the sole power to terminate the trust and acquire
the corpus. The policies, besides naming the grantor-wife
as the beneficiary, also gave her the sole right to the loan
and cash surrender values, and the exclusive right to change
the beneficiary. The Board of Tax Appeals adhered to its
prior decisions that section 167 (a) (3) did not come into
play even though the trust grantor is the beneficiary of the
insurance policies. 44 The court of appeals, however, held
and the son's children); Edwin C. May, 3 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 733 (1944).
But Of. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 677(a), the final sentence of which
exempts from the general rule of taxability a power which can take effect
upon "the beneficial enjoyment of the income" only after ten years. Cf.
Tress. Reg. § 1.677 (a)-1(c).
142. Absent statute, it is permissible for a trust to accumulate its income
for a period not exceeding that permitted by the rule against perpetuities.
I ScoT, TRUSTS § 62.11 (2d ed. 1956). To the extent that purchase of
insurance is, as it appears to be, an accumulation, there is no objection on
this ground absent statute, to the trustee's using trust funds for such
purposes. The perpetuities period, in the case of insurance trusts, begins to
run from the date of the trust grantoer's death. 1 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 57.3, at
n. 31 (2d ed. 1956). There may be problems, however, as to whether under
state law, and absent express authorization, a trustee may invest trust
funds in insurance. See Mannheimer & Wheeler, Trusts of Insurance
on Relatives Lives, 27 TAXES 453, at 458, n. 27 (1949) for a convenient
summary of the law on this point.
In some states, accumulations are specifically forbidden by statute.
E.g., N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 16. See also 2 ScoTw, TRUSTS § 62.11 (2d
ed. 1956). However, at least two cases have held that investment in insurance was not deemed to be a forbidden accumulation under the relevant
statute. In the Matter of Hartman's Estate, 126 Misc. 862, 215 N. Y. Supp.
802 (Sup. Ct. 1926) (leading case) which followed Bassill v. Lister, 9 Hare
177, 20 L. J. Ch. 641, 15 Jurist 964 (1851). New York has since dispelled
all doubt by specifically providing that investment in insurance will not
be deemed an unlawful accumulation. See N. Y. PERs. PROP. LAW § 16.
143. 108 F. 2d 1005 (7th Cir. 1940), rev'g 38 B. T. A. 419 (1938).
144. 38 B. T. A. at 424, relying upon Lucy A. Blumenthal, 30 B. T. A. 591
(1934) and Gail H. Baldwin, 36 B. T. A. 364 (1937). See note 114 supra.
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that the wife, by retaining broad rights under the policies,
was, in effect, using*her own income, through the medium
of a trust, to purchase property for herself in the form
of the policies payable only to her at a future date.
It is obvious that the income of these trusts was
devoted solely to the grantor's own uses. She was the
sole beneficiary of the policies involved in the first
trust; she alone had the right to change the beneficiary; she alone was entitled to their cash surrender
or loan value .
. [Although] the taxpayer divested
herself of the control of the trust estate and of its
income, the fact remains that income was expended
solely for her own purposes, and the property upon
which it was expended, namely the insurance policies,
145
belonged to her and her alone.
The court of appeals pointed out that even though "a liberal
interpretation of section 167 [(a) (1)] might tend to establish the immunity of the grantor from the tax," such
a reading was improper in the light of the "practical facts"
146
upon which the court relied.
When the benefits under the policies are not as sweeping
as in Morton, the result will necessarily turn upon the facts,147
viz. the terms of the trust and policies, the rights retained
by the grantor under the policies and, to a lesser extent,
under the trust instrument. As expected, the decisions can
almost be classified as "liberal" (i.e., favoring the taxpayer)
or "strict". Thus, in a leading "strict" ruling,14s a wife
funded an irrevocable trust to carry insurance on her husband's life, with a proviso that the proceeds should pay off
any estate and inheritance taxes on the wife's share of
her husband's estate should she survive him, but otherwise to
be disposed of by her should she predecease him. There was
no evidence that the wife retained any other rights under
the policies. The fact that the benefit of the insurance was
indirect and contingent was deemed irrelevant, for the
Earlier in its opinion the Board had treated the case as a § 166 (now § 676)
problem, holding that H's interests in the trust constituted him a party
with a substantial adverse interest whose consent was necessary before
W could, during H's lifetime, reach the funds which she had placed in
trust.
145. 108 F. 2d at 1007.
146. Id. at 1008.
147. Commissioner v. Jergens, 127 F. 2d 973, 974 (5th Cir. 1942) (dictum).
148. Phipps v. Helvering, 124 F. 2d 288 (D. C. Cir. 1941).
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income would "be used for her benefit whether her ultimate
receipt of it results from a vested or contingent right."'149
Indeed, the statute "is not concerned with whether the taxpayer's right to the income is conditional or unconditional,
contingent or vested, for ... the consideration is not what
is done but what might be done thereunder. If there is any
possibility that the income of the trust may be received by
the grantor, then such income is taxable to the grantor."' 150
A similar result was reached in an early Board of Tax Appeals case holding a daughter taxable on funded trust income applied to premiums on her father's life insurance,
since she would receive the proceeds on his death.' 51 The
principle of these decisions was strongly affirmed recently
by the Tax Court'12 which in previous years had seemed
notably reluctant to invoke the accumulation rule against
insurance trusts merely because the grantor was a beneficiary
of the insurance. Finally, it would seem that taxation would
follow if the income from the trust could be used to discharge
legal obligations of the grantor.
In Commissioner v. Jergens,153 the only appellate decision
squarely holding the wife not taxable under section 677 (a) (2)
dealing with circumstances of this character, the wife, according to the sketchy statement of facts in the opinion,
"could never receive anything from accumulations or the
proceeds of the insurance."' 54 In addition, she had renounced
cash and loan values of the insurance, had made the trust
terminable only by her husband, and could withdraw the
policies only with his consent. 155
To the extent that a recent Tax Court' ruling can better
indicate the state of the'law than an eighteen year old court
of appeals decision, the 1959 Estate of Edward H. Wade:
witz' 5 6 case seems almost squarely contra to Commissioner 'V.
149. Id. at 292.

150. Commissioner v. Willson, 132 F. 2d 255, 257 (6th Cir. 1942); see
also id. at 258.
151. William Lea Taylor, 37 B. T. A. 875 (1938).
152. Edward H. Wadewitz, 32 T. C. 538 (1959), discussed in the text
infra at note 156. An older decision in accord is Commissioner v. Van
Dusen, 138 F. 2d 510 (6th Cir. 1943) (per curiam), cert. denied, 321 U. S.
776 (1944), reversing Charles B. Van Dusen, P-H B. T. A. Mem. Dec.
42,356 (June 20, 1942).
153. 127 F. 2d 973 (5th Cir. 1942), affirming an unreported Tax Court
decision.
154. Id. at 975.
155. Id. at 974.
156. 32 T. C. 538 (1959).
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Jergens. In Wadewitz, a husband and wife followed the
typical two-donor trust scheme, with H contributing $90,000
of his life insurance and W furnishing the funding securities.
W and two children were named as trustees. W was also
the beneficiary, and following H's death was to receive a
fixed income for life with the remainder over to the children. Since the trustees had "all right, title, interest, and
benefits in such policies"'1 7 as were assigned to them, it is
apparent that during her life, W did not have cash surrender
and loan rights under the policies. Thus, she evidently
had no greater rights than the widow in Jergens, having
only a hope of the insurance after the insured's death. The
Tax Court held that the trust income was accumulated for
future distribution to W who should accordingly be taxed
on it. Indeed, "there can properly be no question"'158 that
the income fell within section 677(a) (2)'s predecessor, section 167(a) (1).
This case comes close to holding as a
matter of law that any trust grantor who funds a trust of
insurance on another's life where she is the beneficiary will
be subjected to tax on income under section 677(a) (2).
The phrase, "matter of law," seems accurate, since the case
did not turn upon any retained rights under the insurance
policies or other special facts, but solely upon the finding
that the trust grantor was the insurance beneficiary. The
only dispute was with the fact that W must survive H in
order to acquire the benefits under the policies, and this
contention the court dismissed on well settled principles that
accumulations need not be uhcondtional to invoke section
677(a) (2).159
Collectively, these cases, and especially Wadewitz, indicate the extent to which section 677(a) (2)'s accumulation
provisions narrow the area of choice for insurance trusts
even of policies on the life of someone other than the grantor.
They show that for the grantor to avoid personal taxation,
the trust must not only confine the policies to those on the
life of someone other than the grantor, but also it must
restrict to an undetermined extent the benefits which the
grantor may retain, present or future, under the policies
and the trust. Thus again, non-tax considerations as to the
157. Id. at 539.

158. Id. at 541.
159. Particular reliance was placed on Kent v. Rothensies, 120 F. 2d

476, 478 (3d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U. S. 659 (1941).
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desirability of a grantor's renouncing substantial incidents
of control over the policies is thrown into high relief. These
results may be eased to some extent by the trust of insurance on the life of some person other than the grantor,
with third persons niamed as beneficiaries, and with powers
and rights allocated among them. An example of this is
naming children as beneficiaries of a husband's trust of
life insurance on his wife. As we shall see later,6 0 this
scheme may, in turn, raise problems of its own as to whether
the wife or the children will be taxed on the trust income
applied to the policies for their benefit. In sum, these decisions and the doubts they raise still seem viable, since
section 677(a) (2) does not materially change the language
of its statutory predecessor nor limit its application as developed under the 1939 Code.
2. Section 677(a) (1)

(Corresponding to Section 167(a) (2)
of the 1939 Code)

A less important limitation upon section 677(a) (3) immunity for insurance trusts of another's policies inheres in
section 677(a) (1), formerly section 167(a) (2) which taxes
the grantor where trust income "is...or may be distributed
to the grantor." Such a problem may arise if the trust instrument, besides authorizing premium payments on another's life insurance, leaves open- the possibility that the
funds for that purpose might be paid over to the grantor.
Thus, in William Clark Arkell,'61 a father contributed policies
on his own life to a trust funded by his son who, as trustee,
"had the discretion to act in such a way as to avoid at any
time the necessity of paying additional premiums and thus
gain the income for himself."'162 Trust income was applied
to the premiums, and although section 167 (a) (3) concededly
did not apply, the Tax Court held that the entire trust income
"may be distributed to the grantor," and although not so
distributed, should therefore be taxed to him. This problem
seems one which could be readily solved by specific stipulation
160. See infra at Section VI (B).
161. 38 B. T. A. 177 (1938). Cf. Alfred Cowles, 6 T. C. 14 (1946) (beneficiary may demand entire net income of the trust; trustees could take out
insurance on beneficiary's life, paying premiums from the income. Held:
Beneficiary taxable under old § 22(a) on the amount of income used for
such a policy). The same decision would probably be made in Cowles under
§ 678(a) (2).
162. 38 B. T. A. at 181.
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that the trust income could not be paid over to the grantor
under any circumstances, or that it must be paid to named
third persons if not used for the insurance premiums.
E. The "Good Faith" Limitation as Applied to Insurance
Trusts Not Taxable Under Section 677(a) (3)
1. Transfer by Nominal Grantor of Securities to Fund Trust
Besides the various pitfalls already enumerated, efforts
to reduce personal income taxation through trusts of insurance on the life of someone other than the grantor have
faltered and failed because of the imprecise judicial doctrine
which requires "good faith" in the insurance trust transaction.
The first case illustrating the operation of this general
limiting principle involves efforts by an insured, the "real
grantor," to secure the benefits of trusts of insurance on
his own life without incurring section 677(a) (3) personal
income tax liability. He transfers the securities to another
person, the "nominal grantor," who then, apparently "voluntarily," funds the trust containing policies on the transferor's
life. Under this scheme, it is hoped that the "real grantor"
will escape all income tax liability under established principles,
and that the "nominal grantor" will not personally be taxed
since the transferred policies insure some life other than
that of the "nominal grantor." When such a scheme fails,
the effect is to treat the arrangement as merely a straight
trust of insurance on the life of the "real grantor" who is
then taxed under section 677 (a) (3). This result does not
depend upon statutory construction, but upon judicial conviction that the "real grantor" seeks to do indirectly what
he is barred from doing directly. It is this factor, then,the presence or absence of "good faith"-that distinguishes
this situation from the Cartinhour case which obviously assumed that the two-grantor funding arrangement upheld
1 2
there was carried through in "good faith." a
The failure of a "bad faith" device is well illustrated by
the strong fact situation in the leading Tax Court decision
of Lorenz Iversen.'6 8 Here the taxpayer created an unfunded
trust of $1,000,000 face value life insurance on his own life,
naming his wife and children as beneficiaries, and conferring
162a. See Part V (B) (2) supra.
163. 3 T. C. 756 (1944).
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upon the trustee all other rights under the policies. Two
months later, the taxpayer's children funded a trust of securities worth nearly $500,000 which the taxpayer had given
them for that purpose. Since the evidence did not indicate
that the taxpayer intended to transfer these funds without
limitations, he was deemed to be the real grantor of the
trust established with the funds, and therefore taxable on
the income used for the life insurance premiums.
If, on the other hand, there has been an absolute and unqualified transfer of funds, the fact that those funds subsequently find their way into a trust of insurance on the life
of the transferor of the funds will not subject him to taxation.
0
As the court said in Rockwell v. Granger,'
holding the
transferor not liable to tax on funds used for his insurance,
"[t]his insurance and bonds the [taxpayer] gave to his wife
without any condition, limitation or qualification whatever,"
and the trust which she established with the funds "was
created without any agreement or control or direction of
the [taxpayer] .,1"5
Such a saving factor is not automatically established by
showing that title to the securities (or other funds or property) passed to the one creating the trust ;106 it also requires
a showing that the transferor did not continue to *exert
any "control" over the use and. disposition of the funds.1 6 7
This means that transfer of the securities to i trust of the
transferor's life insurance, or the use of the income to pay
the premiums on such insurance, must truly be "voluntary"
on the part. of the new owner of the funds. The cases, without specifically so declaring, point unmistakably to the
burden resting upon the individual who the Government contends is the "real grantor,' 168 in this situation, the transferor of the securities. This burden may be a heavy one when
the transactions are within the family, and especially between
a husband and wife, for then they "must be closely scrutinized
to determine their real character."'0 19 This indicates that
164. 62 F. Supp. 907 (W. D. Pa. 1945).
165. Id. at 909-10.
166. Although, of course, not conclusive, passage of absolute title is a
strong factor favoring the taxpayer. See the court's reliance on that in

Rockwell v. Granger, 62 F. Supp. 907 at 909-10.
167. Id. at 910.
168. See George Washington, Sr., 36 B. T. A. 74 at 79 (1937).
169. Christina G. Lipe, 3 CCH Tax Ct. Mem" 917 (1944) ( emble);
George H. Whiteley, 42 B. T. A. 402, 415 (1940), affd, 120 F. 2d 782 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U. S.657 (1941) ("Meeting of the minds of petitioner and his wife has not been negatived").
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there is no presumption of the existence of the forbidden
degree of "control" merely because of the close personal
relationship of the individuals involved.
The essential finding that the transaction was in good
faith may rest upon evidence of a non-tax motive on the
part of the transferor, 170 or upon the fact that tax-wise no
sensible person would have adopted that course of action
as a means of saving taxes,' 7 ' or that the insured takes out
the policies clearly at the behest of another person and
retains no right to change the beneficiary. 72 Even though
documentary evidence might well raise "reasonable suspicions" that the transfer was exclusively tax-motivated and
therefore not in "good faith," this may be rebutted by an
affirmative showing through oral testimony upon which the
trier of fact may conclude that tax objectives were not
primary..'7 Finally, while tax objectives may suggest "bad
faith," it seems perfectly clear that a sophisticated recognition
of the tax consequences of alternative transactions and the
selection of the one entailing minimum personal tax liability
will not of itself vitiate the transaction, if otherwise it appears
to be bona fide. All in all, it is "wholly a question of fact'

1

74

170. George H. Whiteley, supra at 409. Thus, in Rockwell v. Granger,
supra note 169 the husband-transferor's objective was to provide for his
wife after he had experienced severe financial reverses in stock trading,
(id. at 909), and this was strengthened by his complete divestment of all
control of or interest in the transferred securities (id. at 910). Similarly,
in Christina G. Lipe, 3 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 917 (1944), her object, established by oral testimony, was a sense of "moral obligation" to distribute
funds inherited from her deceased husband as he, had requested, coupled
with the fact that the funds thus transferred were far more than needed to
maintain the premiums on the life insurance subsequently taken out on her
life by her daughters, the transferees. Id. at 918-19.
1 171. "If her motive was primarily, or even substantially, that of tax
-avoidance by the creation -of trusts for the purpose of paying for insurance upon her own life, she chose a most expensive method to accomplish it. We think it unlikely that her gift sprang from any such motive."
Christina G. Lipe, supra note 170, at 919. Although a taxpayer is "extremely tax conscious, as shown by various transfers and retransfers of
property between the [taxpayer] and his children in prior years," his
transactions will, not be automatically nullified for tax purposes, at least
where it does not appear that "those transfers were made merely to reduce
income tax." George Washington, Sr., 36 B. T. A. 74 at 79 (1937). In
Lucy A. Blumenthal, 30 B. T. A. 591 (1934), the Board noted the Comtrnissioner's argument that the trust of insurance on the life of some person
other than the grantor would fail because of "a controlling purpose to
reduce or evade taxes" (id. at 595), but did not decide the issue since the
record was found devoid of evidence of such a "controlling purpose."
Seemingly, the test would not be met merely on a showing of no more than
a subjective tax reduction motive, but would probably require some indication that the scheme was, viewed objectively, unreal or a sham.
172. Christina G. Lipe, supra note 170, at 919.
173. Id. at 918.
174. Ibid.
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whether the transfer is, from a tax standpoint, merely color75
able or in good faith.'
If in these and like cases, the transaction is skillfully
handled with due regard to formalities, and if it has some
independent justification, there is a good chance of obtaining
the desired result. This is excellently demonstrated by
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Hoey'7 6 where the
result favoring the taxpayer depended almost entirely upon
careful drafting of the instruments, conformity to their terms,
and an independent non-tax justification. 177 There a father
had established three very large irrevocable security trusts
for his son, giving him a power to encroach on the corpus
at his discretion. 73 Exercising this power, the son in substance terminated the old trusts, obtained their funds, established new trusts with the funds, and transferred to those
trusts a number of policies on his father's life. The court
held, interpreting the trust provisions and the surrounding
circumstances, that the new insurance trusts had been in
fact, and not colorably, created by the son, and that the
income applied to the father's policies could not be taxed to
him on a theory that he was the real grantor. This result
followed despite a showing that an obvious purpose was to
reduce the father's extremely high-bracket taxes.
Obviously, the application of any standard of "good faith"
must and will be determined upon the facts of the individual
case. For this reason, the transfer of funds within a closelyknit group followed by establishment of a trust, the income
175. In George H. Whiteley, note 169 supra, the tax scheme so strongly
suggested tax evasion that it failed altogether. There, a taxpayer, ostensibly acting under the guidance of financial advisers who had taken over
his affairs following disastrous stock trading losses, had, in effect, taken

out policies on his own life and placed them in an unfunded trust. He also
executed a note, again in connection with straightening out his financial
affairs, to his wife who funded the insurance trust with the note and with
some of the taxpayer's securities. Although there was evidence that he
had objected to the plan, the court found that the real purpose was to
carry insurance on his life, and that there was evidence of a mutual understanding that the trust arrangement was for his benefit. He was held
taxable under § 677(a) (3)'s predecessor for the income used for the insurance premiums.
176. 74 F. Supp. 770 (S. D. N. Y. 1947).
177. In Central Hanover this was shown by the fact that the son "needed"
funds, available only through encroachment and not through any of the
other powers he held under the old trusts, for his forthcoming marriage.
178. Today, the reservation in the son of the power to encroach the old
trusts would raise serious problems as to his taxability under § 678 (a) (1),
although, for a very high-bracket taxpayer, such as the original grantor,
it would, on balance, be more beneficial for the presumptively lower-bracket
son to bear the tax.
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from which would be taxed to the high-bracket taxpayer had
he created the trust himself, entails a very considerable risk of
taxation, and an almost complete certainty of contest by the
Commissioner, both administratively and in the courts. Such
Government strictness is to be expected, and is desirable,.
for the risk of tax evasion is exceedingly great, and the
determination of good faith very difficult. Doubtlessly, thedisfavor of such transactions, and the threat of contest, is
designed to steer persons away from tax devices which have
so high a potentiality of misuse. The success of the Central.
Hanover case, both as a matter of statistics and of principle,
is most unusual.
2. Payment of Premiums by Beneficiary of an Income Trust
The second category of cases-to which
many of the observations above apply equally-involves the payment by A
of premiums on B's insurance, out of A's personal funds,
often received from a trust established by B. When this
pattern exists within the family, e.g., B and A are respectively husband and wife, it too will likely incite a claim by
the Government that it is a colorable device for B to escape
section 677(a) (3) income taxation on the funds used for
his premiums. Viewed collectively, the cases establish that if
the trust instrument does not empower the trustee to pay
the premiums, and, most important, if there is no evidence that
the grantor controls or directs the beneficiary's use of the
income, the grantor will not be liable for tax if the beneficiary
should decide to spend the income on insurance on thb
grantor's life.
It is not clear how significant is the absence from the trust
indenture of a provision empowering the trustee to applr
trust income to the grantor's policies. It was negatively significant in one case 17 9 holding a grantor not taxable, but
since that case largely rested on the absence of "control"
in the beneficiary's use of the trust income for the grantbr's
policy premiums, it may be supposed that it would weigh
little in the scales if evidence exhibited the forbidden measure of "control." But, presumably, it does yeoman's work
in a case otherwise supported by evidence of the beneficiary's
voluntary action. Here, as elsewhere, the trustee's power to
apply trust income to the grantor's insurance should be
179. Frederick K. Barbour, 39 B. T. A. 910 at 913 (1939), rev'd on other
grounds, 122 F. 2d 165 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U. S. 691 (1941) (leading case).
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omitted from the trust instrument unless there is good
Yreason to insert it.180 Its presence, followed by a beneficiary's
'use of the trust income, would probably invite litigation,
which would be successful unless there was very clear evidence
of the "voluntary" character of the beneficiary's action.
The critical problems are forced into the notion of "controlled" versus "voluntary" action by the beneficiary. The
synonyms so often used are scarcely more revealing than the
terms they purport to explain, and, as usual, this merely
points to the fact that the determination is, in large measure,
one of informed intuition as to the totality of facts and circumstances in the case. Certainly, if there is any requirement or compulsion, legally enforceable or otherwise, upon the
beneficiary, the grantor is taxable. 181 The same is true on
a showing of "agreement" or "understanding," as it is also
on evidence that the grantor "suggested" and the beneficiary
"acquiesced" in the beneficiary's payment. In addition,
whether or not the beneficiary rather than the grantor,
owns the policies which the beneficiary is supporting, seems
to be an important factor within the case law on this subject.8 2 On this distinction, the Tax Court concludes that if
the policies are owned by the grantor, the beneficiary's payments are a substantial economic benefit to the grantor;
whereas in the contrary case, the benefit is all to the beneficiary who may find that this exposes him to taxation under
section 677(a).183 Moreover, other factors may be significant, e.g. (a) whether the grantor or the beneficiary took
out the policies and paid the initial premiums; (b) the facts
surrounding the beneficiary's decision to use the funds for
that purpose on a long term basis, so that the Tax Court may
conclude simply that "[i] t was her income as beneficiary of
the trust already established for her by [the taxpayer] that
was involved in the decision" to pay the premiums;184 (c)
the fact that the beneficiary, prior to the creation of the trust
-whose income she applied to the policies, may have been paying premiums on the policies, and that independently of the
180. See note 98 supra.
181. Frederick K. Barbour, supra note 179, at 913; L. B. Foster, 8 T. C.
197 at 205 (1947) ; Stephen Hexter, 47 B. T. A. 483 at 490 (1942).
182. Frederick K. Barbour, supra note 179.
183. Henry A. B. Dunning, 36 B. T. A. 1222, 1230-31 (1937), appeal dismissed, 97 F. 2d 999 (4th Cir. 1938), distinguished in Frederick K. Barbour,
.eupra note 179 at 914, Stephen Hexter, supra note 181, at 490, and George
F. Booth, 3 T. C. 505 at 611 (1944). See Part V (D), supra.
184. George F. Booth, supra note 183 at 611.
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trust she had funds to continue doing so. This, indeed, would
be so "even if we assume that trust income paid the premiums.,,18 5
Inferences of "control" may be obvious or subtle. The
emphasis upon the grantor's "suggestion" must be taken, as
the cases show, not to be decisive in itself, but only as an
indicium of "control." But "control" does not follow even
if it "can be said.., that the wife's course of action met with
her husband's approval," for "[i] t is difficult to believe that
this could have been done without the consent and approval
of the husband. Yet... that voluntary and undirected conduct of the wife [has not] resulted in attributing trust income
to the grantor husband, particularly where the income is as
clearly the unqualified property of the wife as it is here.":18 0
But the grantor was held taxable where evidence showed that
his wife paid the premiums from a savings account which
received the trust income and which "was opened principally
for" receiving the trust income, had no other deposits, and
was used to pay the premiums. Far from being available
for the wife's "unfettered use and enjoyment," this was an
"arrangement for paying premiums . . .to make it appear
that they were being paid out of the wife's own funds rather
than out of trust income."' 8 7
These cases indicate that "voluntary" payments by a trust
beneficiary of the premiums on policies of insurance on the
life of the trust grantor will be sustained if the beneficiary
owns the policies. If the trust grantor owns the policies,
payments will likely be taxed to him if the slightest evidence
of "control" is present, as in Dunning.187a Absent the "control" factor, a situation not yet clearly determined, it would
seem likely that a voluntary disposition of the funds, already
taxed to the beneficiary at presumably lower tax rates, would
not result in taxation to the grantor when used to pay the pre185. Stephen Hexter, supra note 181 at 490; compare Henry A. B. Dunning, supra note 183, at 1231.
186. George F. Booth, supra note 183 at 611-12.
187. L. B. Foster, 8 T. C. 197 at 206 (1947), acq. 1947-1 Cum. BuLL. 2.
See also the patent tax avoidance scheme, unjustified by other considera-

tions, in Edward E. Rieck, 41 B. T. A. 457 (1940), affd 188 F. 2d 110

(3d Cir. 1941). There, a trustee, empowered to borrow money to pay the
taxpayer's life insurance premiums, called for the income beneficiaries to

pay up the premiums when the trust income was short. However, at the
end of the year, when he distributed income, he did not deduct the amount
of the loans or otherwise seek to collect on them. The Board of Tax Appeals

held that the funds thus advanced were really loans to be restored from
income, and that trust income had been applied to the grantor's policies.
187a. See note 183 supra.
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miums on his life insurance policies, particularly where he
has renounced rights and powers under those policies. On
the whole, the decisions noticeably turn to a larger degree
than usual upon the evidence, especially that bearing on the
"control" aspect. Appropriate planning by one cognizant
of the pitfalls may permit achievement of desired goals without the impact of undesired taxation.
VI. TRUSTS OF INSURANCE ON THE LIFE OF A PERSON OTHER
THAN THE GRANTOR: OTHER POTENTIAL GROUNDS
OF TAXATION TO THE GRANTOR

A. Taxation of Insurance Trust Income to the Trust
GrantorUnder the "Clifford" Provisionsof the
InternalRevenue Code (§§671-676)
The cases which have been discussed show that although
trust income applied to insurance on the life of someone
other than the grantor will avoid direct taxation of that
income to the grantor under section 677 (a) (3), it may nevertheless be taxable under section 677 (a) (1) and 677 (a) (2) if
the grantor has reserved broad powers and rights or may
acquire them under the trust or the policies. These sections,
however, are not the only ones which may expose the grantor
to tax despite his insulation from section 677 (a) (3)'s impact.
Prior to the 1954 Code, it was settled that the grantor
of an insurance trust, immune under section 677(a) (3)'s
predecessor, might be taxed under the broad definition of
"income" in section 22(a) of the 1939 Code (now section
61 of the 1954 Code), if he had reserved various indicia of
control such as powers to revoke, alter, or amend the trust,
vote equity securities funding the trust, withdraw them from
the trust, control the application of trust income, or had retained a possibility of reverter. These and like elements of
"control" were decisive in the landmark decision of Helvering
v. Clifford' 8 which rested squarely upon section 61's predecessor, section 22(a) of the 1939 Code, the broad governing
188. 309 U. S. 331 (1940). "Our point here is that no one fact is
normally decisive but that all considerations and circumstances of the
kind we have mentioned are relevant to the question of ownership and
are appropriate foundations for findings on that issue. Thus, where, as
in this case, the benefits directly or indirectly retained blend so imperceptibly with the normal concepts of full ownership, we cannot say that
the triers of fact committed reversible error when they found that the
husband was the owner of the corpus" for purposes of § 61's predecessor.
309 U. S. at 336.
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principle of which could equally apply to insurance trusts as
well as to other types of trusts. The effect of the Clifford
ruling was to "shift nearly all trust income tax litigation
to that section [61's predecessor]' 189 until 1954 when (1)
the Clifford doctrine, previously intermediately formalized
in Treasury Regulations,' 9 0 was Congressionally codified in
1954 Code sections 671-678, and (2) recourse to section 61 for
further "common-law" growth along the lines indicated by
Clifford was largely blocked by section 671.' 91
The Clifford and related rules are codified in subpart E of
the Code, comprised of sections 671-676 and 678, in addition
to section 677 which has been examined in detail. Without
exhausting the multitude of possibilities in these provisions,
we shall look to a few examples under each section to show
how an insurance trust, not falling within any of section 677's
provisions, may nonetheless entail taxation of the trust inpome to the grantor. In these examples, for the sake of
simplicity, we assume that a wife has funded a trust of income-producing securities and insurance policies on her husband's life under "good faith" circumstances precluding
application of any subsection of section 677 so as to make
the grantor-wife taxable.
1. Section 673:

Reversionary Interests

If the trust specifies that within ten years or sooner the
wife creating the trust has a reversionary interest either in
corpus or income, she will be subject to personal taxation
upon the trust's entire income, and not just the income
02
which is or may be applied to the insurance premiums.
A reasonable probability of such a reversion is sufficient
to evoke the result, if she retains a reversionary interest
in the securities. An example of this is where a wife creates
189. SURREY & WARREN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 820 (1955 ed.).
190. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.22 (a)-21. Criticism and defense of these regulations, now academic, centered on whether the Treasury had improperly
selected certain factors as singly decisive of grantor taxation, in view of
the Clifford case's emphasis upon the aggregate impact of a number of

factors. SURREY & WARREN, op. cit. supra note 189, at 828. Commissioner
v. Clark, 202 F. 2d 94 (7th Cir. 1953) held the regulations unconstitutional,
and even questioned the power of Congress to enact the content of the
regulations in statutory form, thus impliedly throwing doubt (although

hardly a substantial doubt) upon the validity of § 671-678.
191. See Part VI (C) infra.
192. More precisely, upon the income attributable to that portion of the
trust (which may be a part of the entire trust) in which the grantor holds
a reversionary interest.
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a trust of insurance upon an unwell or aged husband. Taxation to the grantor can be avoided (1) by not preserving
a reversionary interest, and, to make doubly sure, by explicitly negativing any possibility of reverter by making the
trust ultimately payable to a charitable institution, 193 or to
a government; (2) by granting a reversionary interest to
some person other than herself.1 94 On the credit side, a
more-than-10 year reversionary interest will not expose the
grantor to taxation, and as the time for its expiration approaches, it may safely be extended for an additional like
period of time, without thereby creating tax liability to the
05
grantor.
It should also be noted that while the mere existence of the
grantor's reversionary interest may not bring the trust within
section 673, the income produced by that trust may, as Regs.
§ 1.673 (a)-I point out, be treated as accumulated, and the
grantor taxed under section 677 (a) (2). This would be the
case where W sets up an insurance trust to fund policies on
H's life, and the insurance proceeds are payable to the children on H's death with the trust corpus reverting at the
same time to W. If the trust income has exceeded the amount
of the premiums and this excess ploughed back into the
corpus, it would appear to be a clear section 677 (a) (2) accumulation for W.
2. Section 674: Powers to Control Beneficial Enjoyment
If the wife in our example reserves a power to determine
whether trust income shall be applied to premiums on her
husband's policies or allocated among her adult children, she
will be subject to taxation under section 674(a). The prior
consent of an adverse party will, of course, immunize her,
e.g., if the beneficiary of the insurance must first consent
to the diversion of trust income to the use of her children.
The excepted powers under section 674(b), which any person
may exercise, seem ordinarily inapplicable to insurance trusts
as such.' 0 It is arguable, however, that the power of in193. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,

§ 673 (b).

194. Possible tax consequences to this person are considered in the discussion at Part VI (B) infra.
195. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 673 (d).

196. That is to say, that these powers, and their tax consequences, would
ordinarily come into play when retained with respect to the securities
funding the trust. Thus, if a power retained with respect to the funding
securities is "exercisable only by will," it would seem that the grantor would
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dependent trustees under section 674(c) (1) to "distribute,
apportion, or accumulate income to or for a beneficiary or
beneficiaries" may embrace a power to divert income for current distribution to one beneficiary into insurance on a life
other than the grantor for the benefit of another named
beneficiary. If the trust income were solely for that purpose, it could not be taxed to the grantor. It seems that
an independent trustee's discretion to use trust income for
the same purpose would be permissible, and not in conflict
with the obvious purpose of section 674 (c) which allows broad
discretion in an independent trustee without attendant risk
of personal income tax liability on the grantor. Moreover,
such diversion of income would be a distribution or accumulation of income within a class of beneficiaries. Finally,
such application of income would seem, in view of the decisions under section 677 (a) (2) treating trust income applied to certain policies as an "accumulation" for the grantor's
benefit, to be an accumulation of income for a beneficiary
properly exercisable by the independent trustee.
3. Section 675: Administrative Powers
The administrative powers covered by section 675 apparently apply with as much force to insurance as to other
trusts. Thus, a grantor who could borrow or deal with the
trust corpus otherwise intended to fund policies on another's
life would equally be treated as an owner of that portion of
the trust. General powers of administration 9 7 could be
exercised by the grantor if, in so doing, he acts in or with the
consent of one who is in a fiduciary capacity as to the trust,
e.g., voting stock, controlling investments, etc. As to certain
powers, the grantor may safely act only with the permission
of an adverse party. This provision codifies the result in
William J. Garland'98 where the Tax Court held revocable,
in effect, a trust which purported to be irrevocable but from
which corpus the grantor could borrow (up to $100,000)
not be liable for income tax on the trust subject to that power. See INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, § 674(b) (3). Similarly, a retained power to distribute
the securities funding the insurance trust to or for a beneficiary under "a

reasonably definite standard which is set forth in the trust instrument' t

would not subject the grantor to income tax in the case of an insurance
trust any more than in an ordinary trust. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §

674(b) (5) (A).
197. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 675 (4).
198. 42 B. T. A. 324 (1940), subsequent opinion rendered. 43 B. T. A. 731

(1941).
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without security. Like a grantor's power to purchase assets
at his own price, the borrowing power "renders the trust
revocable under section 166 of the Revenue Act of 1934"
(now section 676).199 This type of decision builds a helpful
bridge between section 675 and section 676.
4. Section 676: Power to Revoke
Finally, section 676, relating to a grantor's retained "power
to revest ... title" in himself, obviously is applicable to an
insurance trust where the grantor may recapture the securities funding the trust, although section 676 (b) makes this
provision parallel with section 673's ten-year provision as
to reversions. As with that section, a less than 10 year
power to revoke will subject the grantor to taxation on the
entire income, and not just that applicable to premiums. The
Treasury Regulations under section 676 broadly treat the
term "power to revest" as inclusive of a power to revoke,
terminate, alter, amend, or appoint, provided that it amounts
to a power of revestment.2 0 0 Thus, the early case of DuPont
v. Commissioner,2 0 1 involving three-year revocable trusts on
the grantor's life insurance, could today be decided solely on
the ground of a power to revoke the corpus subjecting the
grantor to tax on the total income, and not just that applied
or applicable to his insurance premiums. The power to revoke may, for tax purposes, be neutralized by the required
consent of an adverse party.
In William J. Garland,20 2 the Tax Court held, as an apparent
alternative, that revocability, in the case of an insurance trust,
could be inferred from the grantor's sole right under the
indenture "'to receive all payments, dividends, surrender
values, and benefits accrued or which may accrue to the
insured during his life, and may exercise all of the insured's
rights, options and privileges under such policy.' The reservation of these rights is tantamount to a reservation of
the right to revest in the trustor that part of the corpus
which consisted of insurance policies.1 20 3 The fact that the
policies were on the grantor's life20 4 seems merely incidental
to the decision, and the Tax Court apparently so believed
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id. at 328; 43 B. T. A. at 735.
Treas. Reg. 1-676(a) (1).
289 U. S. 685 (1933).
42 B. T. A. 324 (1940).
Id. at 329.
Id. at 326.
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since it made no reference to section 677 (a) (3) 's predecessor,
as it could have if it had thought this characteristic of the
policies to be significant. The fact is that like powers could
be held on the policies on another's life with the grantorinsured possessing nearly equal economic benefits. The
Garlandcase, as expected, also resulted in taxation of the entire trust income to the insured-grantor. The case certainly
seems to warn that trust income applicable to policies subject to such control by the grantor may be taxable to the
grantor on the theory that these powers constitute de facto
a power to revest.
B. Section 678 and Taxation of Insurance Trust Income to
Some Person Other Than the Grantorof the Trust:
The "Mallinckrodt" Doctrine
For the most part, it has been assumed that if the insurance
trust grantor obtains personal income tax immunity, it is
the trust itself which will be taxed on income used for premium payments, and at rates significantly lower than the
grantor's own tax brackets. For example, in the case of
a trust of insurance on some life other than the grantor's,
the trust will carry the tax burden on income applied to
premiums. In some instances, however, the grantor's personal tax immunity may have the effect of shifting the tax,
not to the trust, but to some other individual having an
interest in the trust or in the insurance.
* 1. This is apparent, first of all, in the case of a trust of
insurance on the grantor's own life where the grantor is
tax immune under section 677(a) (3) since the application
of the trust proceeds to the insurance premiums requires the
consent of an income beneficiary who could, if he chose,
require the income, in whole or in part, to be paid to him
rather than used for the premiums, and who is therefore
an "adverse party."20

5

Whatever the use made of the trust

205. Messrs. Mannheimer, Wheeler and Friedman give this as the basic
example in their article, An Unexplored Form of Insurance Trust, 34 TAXEs
494 (1956), already referred to, supra at notes 67-68. They also discuss a
variant of this basic example which would eliminate taxation to the beneficiary in this type of situation. If the beneficiary does not have a right
to demand payment of current income to him, but to "require that the income be distributed to him currently or that it be accumulated for his
benefit or the benefit of his estate," he will not be taxed if in addition
"the trustee is empowered, in his sole discretion, to decide whether the
income is to be so distributed or accumulated." Id. at 495. Thus, the son
has no power to get income currently "exercisable solely by himself," and
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income, the beneficiary is the one taxed, and not the grantor,
since under section 678 (a) (1) the beneficiary has "a power
exercisable solely by himself to vest .. . the income therefrom in himself.120 6 Requiring the power to be exercised by
the income beneficiary in conjunction with some other person
would not affect the beneficiary's status as an "adverse
party" and would seemingly eliminate his exposure to income
tax because of his power over the income. Thus, we have
here a simple, convenient, and workable insurance trust on
the grantor's life with relatively favorable tax consequences.
It functions well as long as the beneficiary who might have
to bear the tax is in a lower bracket than the grantor, and
that is typically the case.
An important point should be noted here. On the surface,
it would appear that section 678's tax-switching effect could
apply broadly since the person who must "solely" use his
power is not described by section 678 as an "adverse party" 20 7
or one acting in a fiduciary capacity; 20o indeed, for aught
that appears, he might well be a "non-adverse" 2 09 or even
a "related or subordinate party." 210 The prospect of broad
tax saving possibilities is illusory, since usually the taxswitching effect will depend initially upon the grantor's
powers having to run the gamut of an "adverse party's"
prior consent. In the example given in the preceding paragraph, the result turns upon the fact that the income beneficiary is an "adverse party" under section 677(a) (3); if
he were merely a non-adverse party, section 677(a) (3)
would automatically tax the grantor on the trust income, and
no occasion would arise to consider, for purposes of section
so is not taxed on the income; the income applied to the insurance policies
likewise does not result in taxation to the son, but to the trust.
A further refinement would employ the basic example, but instead of
giving the son the right to demand income currently, he "is given the
power to require the trustee - an independent trustee - to distribute the
income to any one or more of a class composed of the son and the son's
issue." Id. at 496. If the son fails to exercise his power so that the income
goes to the insurance premiums, there is tax only to the trust and not to
the beneficiary.
206. Nor would § 678 (b) shift the income back to the grantor. Although
the income beneficiary in our example has a "power over income," the very
presence of this power in an admittedly adverse party would preclude the
grantor from being "treated as the owner under §§ 671-677, inclusive,"
so that the requirement in the last clause of § 678(b) would remain unsatisfied.
207. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 672 (a).
208. Cf. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 675 (4).
209. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 672(b).
210. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 672 (c).
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the character of the "person other than the

Before passing to the next examples, we should first
call attention to a point applicable to insurance and also to
other types of trusts. It is the determination of who shall
bear the income tax when both the grantor and some "person
other than the grantor" might reasonably be taxed. Section
678(b) provides a limited, and useful, statutory solution.
It declares, in effect, that whenever both the grantor or the
other candidate for the tax may be treated as "owner" of
the trust or some portion of it, the conflict will be settled
in favor of taxing the grantor. Thus, given a trust of insur-

ance on the grantor's life, prima facie exposing him to section 677(a) (3) tax, the grantor will pay the tax, even though
some other person has, for example, a power to demand and
receive trust income at his will. 2 11 If it is corpus rather
than income that is subject to the other person's demand,
and both grantor and the other person could be taxed, section 678(b)'s language is inapplicable; section 678(a)
controls and imposes the tax upon the other person by virtue
of his possession of a power over the trust.212 As we have
seen, even this subjection to tax can be eliminated if the
other person's power is not exercisable "solely" by him.2 13
211. This would be the case, for instance, if a non-adverse party could
acquire the income. If, as in preceding examples, the party who can
demand the income is adverse to the use of trust income for the grantor's
insurance, the grantor, by the very terms of § 677 (a) (3), is tax immune.
212. This would be true even if the holder of a power over corpus were
non-adverse. Section 677(a) (3) is not satisfied, because application of
trust income to the grantor's insurance policies is not subject to an adverse
party's veto. However, the second line of defense is reached: if the power
of the "person other than the grantor is as to corpus," § 678 (b) declares
that it is he, rather than the admittedly otherwise taxable grantor, who
carries the tax burden. He could also immunize himself under § 678 (a) (1)
by conditioning his power over corpus by joint action with another person.
Thus, the tax statute seems to open the way for a device of dubious justification: a trust of the grantor's life insurance on which neither the
grantor nor an adverse holder of power over the trust corpus can be taxed
on the trust income used for the grantor's policies. This certainly seems
to circumvent the spirit of § 677(a) (3).
213. Undoubtedly, the courts will not permit a "person other than the
grantor" to act collusively with another person, and therefore escape §
678(a) (1) taxation on the ground that his power was not exercisable
"solely by himself." This would seem to be true although there is nothing
in the statute specifying the type of party whose joint action with the
power-holder will save the latter from tax. Certainly, if the other party
is a dummy, one could readily say that the "person other than the grantor"
is able, in substance, to exercise the power "solely by himself." Indeed,
there should be considerable scrutiny and strictness here, since the "solely"
limitation has potentialities of a major loophole through purely formal
arrangements. Courts would seem justified in allocating the burden of

Published by Scholar Commons, 1960

69

SouthCAROLINA
Carolina Law
Review,
Vol. 13, Iss. 2 [1960],
SOUTH
LAW
QUARTERLY.
L.Vol,Art.
13 2

Hence, if the power is over corpus, in'practice the only ques:
tion will be the taxability vel non of the "person other than
2 14
the grantor."
2. Let us examine the two-grantor trust in the light of
these principles. Here, typically, W contributes incomeproducing securities to fund a trust to which H contributes
insurance policies on his own life payable to W on H's death.
H is not taxed under the applicable precedents, since one
who contributes only policies to a trust has not as yet been
treated as the "grantor" of the trust for section 677 (a) (3)
purposes.214a W (who funded the trust) is not taxed under
section 677 (a) (3) since the income does not go to policies
on the grantor's life, although the possibilities of taxation
under section 677 (a) (2) for an accumulation for the grantor's
benefit are now increased with the Wadewitz decision.2 15
Suppose that under the trust instrument H is given a
power to acquire the corpus of the trust, i.e., the funding securities. As to this power, H would be taxable upon the entire trust income under the MaZlinckrodt doctrine, 21 6 now
codified as section 678, since he has a "power exercisable
solely by himself to vest the corpus" of the trust in himself. Two consequences now follow:
(a) if the power
must be exercised only in conjunction with some other person,
proving the genuineness of the joint action to the person seeking to escape
tax by asserting that he had no "solely" exercisable power.
214. We say "in practice," since the "person other than the grantor"
will usually have the requisite power under § 678 (a) because he will hav6
sufficient beneficial interest to be an "adverse party" whose prior consent
is necessary to prevent grantor taxation under § 677 (a) (3). -The possibiliy that the "person other than the grantor" will not be taxed arises,
of course, from the device of reauiring him to exercise his power with
another person.
214a. See Part V (B) (2) supra
215. Edward H. Wadewitz, 32 T. C. 538 (1959). See the text at notes
156-59 supra.
216. So-called from Edward Mallinckrodt, Jr., 2 T. C. 1128 (1943), afffd
146 F. 2d 1 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 324 U. S.871 (1945). Here, a soi had
power to demand payment to him of income of a trust created by his father.
Absent such request, the income was added to corpus which the son could
appoint by will. The court held the son taxable on the income under the
predecessor of § 61. See also Emery v. Commissioner, ]56 F. 2d 728 (1st
Cir. 1946) ; Spies v. United States, 180 F. 2d 336 (8th Cir. 1950) ; Bunting
v. Commissioner, 164 F. 2d 443 (6th Cir. 1947), all holding taxable under
§ 61(a) s predecessor trust income available to persons other than the
grantor. The Mallinckrodt doctrine was thereafter restated by the Internal
Revenue Service in expanded form in the so-called "Mallinckrodt Regulations." Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.22(a)-22. Section 678 of the 1954 Code, of
course, now provides the statutory base. It should be noted that the Mallincorodt and Clifford decisions, and their subsequent progeny, rest on precisely the same rationale, that is, treating as the true trust owner the
person who has the actual control of the trust, and therefore taxing the
trust income to him personally.
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e.g., an independent trustee, section 678 (a) is inapplicable,
and H is not taxed on the trust income; (b) more importantly,
it would seem that W is now insulated from the possibility
that the trust income used for insurance payable ultimately
to her will be taxed to her under section 677 (a) (2). The
reason is that the normal tax-switching effect under the
"general rule" of section 678 (a) is inapplicable if the "person other than the grantor" has a "power over income" and
yet the trust grantor would "otherwise [be] treated as owner"
of the trust under some other provision. That is to say, if
H could demand the income of the securities while W is subject to tax under section 677 (a) (2) for accumulating income for herself, it is W, and hot H, who will be taxed. If H
can demand the corpus, section 678(b)'s "exception" is inapplicable, and the general rule of section 678 (a) would
govern. If H can demand corpus only with the trustee's
consent, he too is not subject to tax. Since recourse to
judicial lawmaking under the general definition of "income"
in section 61 (formerly section 22) is now blocked by section
671, there seems no other ground to assert a tax against H in
these circumstances.
To vary the example above, suppose H has been given
extensive powers under the insurance trust (1) to secure the
loan and surrender values of his policies and/or (2) to change
the beneficiaries of the insurance trust. As to (1), it would
be arguable that this is equivalent to a power to vest at
least part of the trust corpus in the holder of the power,
since as time goes on the insurance policies, now part of the
trust res, gain great- monetary value. The principles outlined in the preceding paragraph would then apply.
As to (2), it would seem that this is a section 674 power
to control beneficial enjoyment at any time, and it may be
assumed for purposes of argument that it does not come
within any of the exceptions of section 674(b) and (c). Our
only interest here is whether H now has, under section 678
(a) (2), "such control as would, within the principles of
sections 671 to 677, subject a grantor of a trust to treatment
as the owner thereof." It would seem that he could not
be taxed, even if there were present the requisite degree
of "control," since section 678 (a) (2) envisions that such
"control" is a residue left after the renunciation of a broader
power "exercisable solely by [the beneficiary] to vest the
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corpus or the income therefrom in himself," and by hypothesis
there has not been the requisite quantum of power at any
time. Moreover, although this is a type of Malinckrodt situation, the codification of that doctrine by section 678 is
subject to section 671's limitations so that further "common
law of taxation" development or extension of the Mainckrodt
doctrine could not be based on section 61's definition of "income." In sum, then, neither H nor W would be taxable
on the income used for premiums, but it would be taxed
at the trust's low rates.
This example underscores a significant fact about section
678. It is clear that there are limits to the power which a
person other than the grantor may retain and yet not find
himself treated as owner of a portion of the trust. The
statutory test is whether the power, exercisable solely by himself, is equivalent to an ability to "vest the corpus or the
income therefrom in himself." It would seem that a power
to revoke 217 would fall within this category, and perhaps a
reversionary interest, 218 though less probably, a power to
direct that the income be "held or accumulated for future
distribution to" him.2 19 Powers of administration2 20 or of
controlling beneficial enjoyment22 1 would clearly seem not
to be the equivalent of the power to "vest the corpus or the
income" in himself, even though he has important powers
which substantially give control of the benefits of the
funds albeit for others than himself. Of course, although
those powers might not affect him under section 678(a) (1),
they might result in taxing trust income to him if he
had renounced larger powers "to vest corpus or income"
in himself and still retained the lesser powers of "control"
under section 678(a) (2). This raises the further question
whether any or all of such powers can be retained by the
non-grantor party provided they are not exercisable "solely
by himself" but only in conjunction with another person,
such as a trustee. Since nothing is said in section 678 (a) (1)
about an "adverse party," it would seem, on the bare statutory
language, that a trustee's consent would be enough to insulate
the third party from tax liability. If this is so, it would follow
that an insurance trust could be established with very broad
217. Of.INT. REV.

CODE OF

1954, § 676.

218. Of. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 673.
219. Of. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 677(a) (2).
220. Of.INT. REV.CODE OF 1954, § 675.
221. Cf. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 674.
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powers left to the beneficiary-powers which, if possessed
by the grantor, would inevitably result in personal taxation
to him of trust income-and yet the beneficiary would not
be subject to section 678 taxation if exercise of these powers
required the prior consent of a trustee.
3. No significant section 678 question seems to be presented in another type of trust already discussed. That is
the arrangement typified by H funding a trust of policies
on W's life with their children designated as beneficiaries.
H is not taxed under section 677(a) (3) ; W is likewise not
taxed under section 677 (a) (2) -her most likely point of
exposure-since she is not the beneficiary. Even if it is
arguable that the accumulation of income through insurance
for the children is such that if it were being done for the
trust grantor it would subject him to section 677 (a) (2) taxation, it is clear that section 678 could not switch the income tax to the children since they never had a section 678
(a) (1) power "exercisable solely" by them to vest trust
corpus or income, and if they have a lesser degree of "control"
under section 678(a) (2) it is not the residue of a renunciation of the broader power. The trust income is therefore
taxed to the trustee at the trust's low rates.
4. One case decided under section 22 of the 1939 Code
should be noted. In Alfred Cowles222 the grantor established
a trust the income from which should be paid to his son,
the taxpayer, "if he demands it," the unpaid income to be
added to the trust principal, and the entire trust estate to
be appointed by the son by will. The son was one of the
trustees, the other being his brother. The trust indenture
empowered the trustees to take out life insurance for the son,
and in the taxable year trust income was used for a $60,000
policy. The Tax Court held that under the Maflinckrodt
doctrine, section 22 of the 1939 Code required that the son
be taxed upon the trust income used for insurance on his
life. The court noted223 that as to the income so applied, it
was "within [the son's] power... as one of the two trustees
a policy and to have
to have blocked the taking out of such
2 24
taken all of the net income for himself."
222. 6 T. C. 14 (1946).
223. Id. at 21.
224. The Mallinclrodt concept was also applied in Ralph W. Conant,
7 T. C. 453 (1946), to an insurance trust. Here the grantor funded four
insurance trusts with his wife as beneficiary, but gave his wife a power
to revoke and take the corpus and undistributed income (id. at 456) as
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It would seem that on these facts the same result would
follow today under the 1954 Code. First, there is no section 677(a) (3) basis for attacking the grantor, since the
policies are not on his life. Second, the income beneficiary
has such a cluster of powers that they would be sufficient
to tax him under the general rule of section 678 (a). As we
shall now show, the fact that trust income is or may be applied to insurance on the life of this "person other than the
grantor" is of no consequence in reaching this result.
Varying the Cowles' facts, suppose the father establishes
a trust in which he retains no rights or interests which could
subject him to tax under section 671-677. As in Cowles, the
trustee may take out insurance on the life of the income beneficiary, and does so. With only this potential benefit to him,
clearly section 678(a) (1) does not make the son liable because the trust income may, without his intervention, be
used for premiums on his life, or is in fact used. Moreover,
it would seem that if he and another person were jointly
empowered to decide whether to apply trust income to his
life policies in trust, he would not be liable, for his power
is now no longer "exercisable solely by himself," since the
correlative power to "vest ... the income therefrom in himself" requires the other person's consent also.
The only possibly relevant provision would be section 678
(a) (2), that the son has "such control as would . . . subject
a grantor" to taxation Under section 677(a) (3). As noted,
however, this would ignore the fact that "such control" is
relevant only if it exists as a residue after the "person other
than the grantor" has "previously partially released or otherwise modified" the broader powers defined by section 678
(a) (1). By hypothesis, he had no such power; and thus
he does not have the requisite "cqntrol" even though the
trust income goes to his own life policies.
well as rights to receive or renounce current income (id. at 455). The
Court noted that even here the income used on the policies "might be taxable to the grantor under the literal provisions of section 167 (a) (3)" but
thought that this was overridden by the fact of the wife's "powers, dominion, and control over the trust corpus." Hence, "the payments of premiums
on policies of insurance on [the taxpayer's] life made from this income
at the direction of his wife must be considered for tax purposes, as if
made by his wife from her own income. Under this construction, these
payments can not be considered as constituting income taxable to [taxpayer] under section 167(a) (3)" (id. at 462-63). The same result would
follow today under § 678 (a) (1) because of the wife's sole power to revest
corpus in herself.
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It is obvious, then, that the limited provisions of section
678 do not mean that a "person other than the grantor"
will always be taxed -with respect to some power or right
just because the grantor would be taxed if he had that particular right or power. It is conjecture whether judicial development of the Mallinckrodt doctrine would have tended in
that direction so that there would eventually have developed
a strict one-to-one correspondence between the Clifford and
Mallinckrodt rules on all matters to which they would be
relevant. Clearly, section 678 does not do that. As a consequence, it opens up interesting avenues for estate planning
with insurance trusts having a minimal tax impact. The
instances discussed above are only illustrative.
C. Taxation of Trust Income to Grantor or Other Person
Under Section 61: The Limits of Section 671.
Finally, although we have already observed it in passing,
we should briefly note from a different perspective section
671. The intended effect of this section is to arrest the possibilities of further judicial development within the grantor
or controlled trust area along the lines marked out first by
Clifford and then by the Mallinckrodt cases, both interpreting
section 22 (a), now section 61 of the 1954 Code. These sections, it will be recalled, contain the general definition of
"income." Section 671 now provides that
No items of a trust shall be included in computing
the taxable income and credits of the grantor or of any
other person solely on the ground of his dominion and
control over the trust under section 61 (relating to
definition of gross income) or any other provision
of this title, except as specified in this subpart [i.e.,
225
in subpart E comprising sections 671-678 inclusive].
Apart from the fact that both Clifford and Mallinckrodt trusts
are now subject only to the provisions of sections 671-678, the
effect of the section has its limits. On its face it forecloses
recourse to section 61 only if the taxpayer's "dominion and
control" of the trust is the sole and exclusive basis for such
taxation to him personally, but actually it permits the Commissioner to go outside of sections 671-678 when he can assert
taxation upon grounds other than "dominion and control" ofi
225. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,

§ 671 (emphasis and brackets added).
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the trust, or perhaps even upon such control coupled with
other grounds.
It is enough to note, as the Regulations do, the typical and
likely situations where section 671 will not immunize the
grantor or other person from personal taxation upon the
trust income. 226 Broadly speaking, the rules relating to
the anticipatory assignment of income still remain applicable.
For example, if an insured creates an unfunded trust of
policies on his own life and makes an assignment of his future
income to the trustee to pay the premiums, the grantor is
clearly subject to tax. 227 The same result would follow if,
in our example, the taxpayer assigns to the trustee for premium-payment purposes accrued, but unpaid, income, or
property in which accrued income is inherent, as in the
leading decision of Helve'ing v. Horst.228 Presumably, the
insurance trust grantor remains subject to tax in case he
attempts to assign income derived from sources other than
person services or property, e.g., damages recompensing a
229
legal injury.
Undoubtedly, the taxpayer would be exposed to the
same personal tax liability even though the purpose
for which he assigns income is to support insurance on the
life of some person other than himself. Although there
seems little difference in actual effect between such an assignment and the admittedly tax-immune procedure of funding a trust of someone else's insurance, it is likely that the
law's stout bariers against income assignment to reduce
taxes would nevertheless prevail, and the taxpayer would be
compelled to fund the trust through an outright conveyance
of securities or the like. Finally, we call attention to the
relation of insurance trusts and attempted tax savings through
income shifting within family partnerships and family corporations, but this substantially230separate area of tax law
will not be further discussed here.
These familiar principles thus illustrate an important point,
that under section 671 the possibilities of taxation to the sub226. See Treas. Reg. § 1.671-1(c).
227. Cf. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U. S. 111 (1930). See also Burnet v. Leininger 285 U. S. 136 (1932) (where the taxpayer unsuccessfully sought to
make his wife "an equal partner" for tax purposes in his one-half partnership interest).
228. 311 U. S.112 (1940).
229. Cf. Doyle v. Commissioner, 146 F. 2d 769 (4th Cir. 1945).
230. Noted in Treas. Reg. § 1.671-1(c).
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stantial owner are not exclusively delimited by sections
671-678. Although the occasions are likely to be few, they
may arise from other code sections, or from judicial doctrines
not precisely or at all codified.
VII. CONCLUSION
As we noted at the outset, the insurance trust is a useful
and flexible instrument for estate and business planning, and
its utility will likely grow with the increasing use of life insurance.23 1 Despite limitations imposed by the relevant
statutes and other limitations developed by the courts, the
insurance trust frequently offers itself as a satisfactory
device for reducing income taxes. However, these limiting
factors do govern broad areas, and the quest for income tax
saving must accordingly be balanced against the elements
of control and direction which must be surrendered. Thus,
the insurance trust field is an excellent illustration of the
interplay of areas of the law which too often are compartmentalized. The thoughtful and informed attorney recognizes
these points of intersection and carefully evaluates his client's
interests and needs. No less is to be expected of informed
counsel.
Yet, knowledge and information alone are insufficient.
Maximum effectiveness of a particular use of the insurance
trust largely depends upon the meticulous choice of precise
language, for in well drafted legal instruments as in poetry
"[e]very phrase and every sentence is an end and a beginning."2 3 2 Indeed, as we have already seen, a substantial
number of the insurance trust tax cases have turned upon
the language of the trust instrument. 23 3 Thus, it is not enough
for the attorney to know what is wanted; he must also know
how to achieve what is wanted. In short, by combining knowledge of the subject with astute draftsmanship, the practitioner
can, in many instances, utilize to his client's advantage,

231. See Part I, supra.
232. T. S. ELIOT, Little Gidding, V, in FouR QUARTETS at 38 (1943).
233. See, e.g., notes 81, 83, 88, 97, 147, 176-78, and 179 supra.
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the significant tax-saving possibilities still inherent in the
insurance trust.2 4

234. In conclusion, we point to the proposed Trust and Partnership Income Tax Revision Bill of 1960 (H. REP. No. 9662), already discussed on

another point at note 94a supra. This bill would add to present § 677 a

provision declaring that "discretion exists ... (2) to apply income to the
payment of premiums on policies of insurance on the life of the grantor
* ..
even though the terms of the trust specify that the discretion relates
only to corpus, to the extent that the income of the trust is not required
to be distributed currently." H. Rm. No. 9662, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. §
177(b). The committees give the following example of the application of
this proposed provision: "A establishes a trust and gives the trustee discretion to pay out the income to his son S or to accumulate it. A reserves
the power to withdraw $5,000 of corpus each year. The ordinary income
of the trust exceeds $5,000. A will be treated as the owner of $5,000
of ordinary income, whether the income is paid to S or not, and whether
A makes a withdrawal or not." H. REP. No. 1231, 86th Cong., 2d Sess.
62-63 (1960); S. REP. No. 1616, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 67 (1960). Final
Report, Advisory Committee on Subchapter J at 59. The same result would
probably follow if we substitute for the withdrawal right in the example
a provision that the trustee should annually pay up to $5,000 from corpus
on A's insurance premiums.
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